

Supplementary Information for

How We Think About the Political Stances of Others:
Evidence on Projection from Canada, Germany, and the UK

Seonghui Lee
University of Essex
s.lee@essex.ac.uk

Anthony Kevins
Loughborough University
a.kevins@lboro.ac.uk

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Appendix A. Data

A1. Fieldwork and Sample

The surveys were administered on the Qualtrics platform. Samples were recruited from Qualtrics LLC's online panels, and quotas were imposed on age and gender to match population targets in each country. Participants were not informed in advance that the survey was about politics. Survey non-compliance was identified using a variety of strategies (e.g., straight-liners and speeders) and these respondents were excluded from the sample. Table A1 describes the fieldwork schedule and the sample size. Table A2 provides descriptive statistics for our sample on basic demographic characteristics.

Although our sample reflects population characteristics such as on age and gender, it is not a probability sample. For frame of reference, we compared our sample to benchmark studies in each country to describe key variables for our study – namely, the ideological stances by partisanship and various socio-demographic characteristics. Figures A1, A2, and A3 compare our sample to the sample from each country's national election study data fielded during the period that is closest to our own – namely, CES 2019 (Canada), GLES 2017 (Germany) and BES 2019 (the UK). In each figure, we used red circles to note mean reported left-right placements in our sample by each partisan or socio-demographic group; and blue diamonds to note the mean in the benchmark sample.

Table A1. Survey fieldwork and sample

Country	Fieldwork	Sample
Canada	3/26/2019 – 5/1/2019	1006
Germany	8/8/2019 – 9/5/2019	1006
United Kingdom	1/24/2019 – 2/5/2019	1003

Table A2. Descriptive statistics: Basic demographics

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Canada					
Left-right self-placement	1006	5.03	2.44	0	10
Female	1006	0.49	0.50	0	1
Age	1006	48.64	16.66	18	76
Education	1006	6.77	1.43	2	10
Social class (1=working; 4=upper)	947	1.73	0.70	1	4
Residence (1=urban, 2=suburban, 3=rural)	1006	1.73	0.76	1	3
Religiosity (7=very religious)	989	3.29	2.04	1	7
Union (1=union member; 0=nonmember)	978	0.18	0.39	0	1
Germany					
Left-right self-placement	1006	4.42	2.25	0	10
Female	1006	0.51	0.50	0	1
Age	1006	47.89	16.72	18	76
Education	1006	5.62	1.62	1	10
Social class (1=working; 4=upper)	936	1.91	0.72	1	4
Residence (1=urban, 2=suburban, 3=rural)	1006	1.35	0.48	1	2
Religiosity (7=very religious)	997	2.70	1.89	1	7
Union (1=union member; 0=nonmember)	972	0.17	0.38	0	1
United Kingdom					
Left-right self-placement	1003	4.79	2.44	0	10
Female	1003	0.49	0.50	0	1
Age	1003	46.76	16.24	18	76
Education	1003	3.82	1.23	1	6
Social class (1=working; 4=upper)	961	1.48	0.60	1	4
Residence (1=urban, 2=suburban, 3=rural)	1003	1.93	0.71	1	3
Religiosity (7=very religious)	998	2.41	1.78	1	7
Union (1=union member; 0=nonmember)	971	0.15	0.36	0	1

Figure A1. Left-right position by characteristic in Canada, our experimental sample compared to CES sample (2019)




Figure A2. Left-right position by characteristic in Germany, our experimental sample compared to GLES sample (2017)





Figure A3. Left-right position by characteristic in the UK, our experimental sample compared to BES sample (2019)



A2. Experimental Design

In each trial, we presented information about a target person using a screen layout described in Figure A4. The figure is an example from the UK experiment, but is nearly identical to the setup used in other countries (see below for further details). Slot 1 provides basic information about the person's sex and age group, along with a simple avatar image. In each trial, this information is randomly drawn from six types of gender-age group combinations. We chose not to use more realistic pictures because they might introduce unexpected biases into the evaluation of ideological stances (e.g., biases associated with skin colour, faces reminding respondents of real people, etc.).

In addition, we presented the respondents with five pieces of information given in Slots 2-6. Slot 2 describes the partisan affiliation of the target person. To approximate the probability of encountering each type of partisan in the real world,¹ we tripled the number of statements for partisans of major parties (by adding weak and strong versions of partisans to mere identifiers) and pooled approximately 20-30% of the statements as non-partisan. For example, in the UK we have a pool of 15 statements (from which we randomly select one for each target person): 9 for the three traditionally major parties (Cons, Lab, and LibDem), 3 for non-partisans, and the rest for smaller parties (Greens, SNP, UKIP). In Germany, we also pooled 15 statements: 9 for the three traditionally major parties (CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP), 3 for non-partisans, and the rest for smaller parties (AfD, Die Linke, Bündnis90/Die Grünen). In Canada, we utilized a pool of 12 partisanship statements: 6 for the two major parties (Cons, Lib), 3 for non-partisans, and the rest for smaller parties (NDP, Greens, Bloc Quebecois).

Slot 3 shows a statement regarding political value/beliefs of the target person. We sampled five political values/beliefs frequently surveyed in election surveys and political science research – namely, redistribution, cultural diversity, civil liberty versus national security, the government's role in managing economy, and gender equality. We then pooled statements representing two different positions (supporting or opposing) on each value/belief, on the expectation that these positions statements are likely to shape the ideological image of the target person. A total of 10 statements in the pool are consistent across the three country surveys. One of these ten statements is then shown in Slot 3 to describe each target person.


¹ Note that this approximation is not required for the design, nor does it directly affect the results. The reason we impose this rule is to avoid situations where minor party identifiers are present much more frequently than in the real world, and to show partisans of major parties more often than non-partisans or partisans of minor parties. We anticipated that this would ease the burden of experimental tasks (assuming that it is easier to evaluate partisans of more familiar parties) and increase the likelihood that respondents find the tasks realistic.

We reserve two slots – Slot 4 and Slot 5 – for policy stances, given the relatively larger number of policy issues and positions. As we did for Slot 3, we first chose a set of policy issues and then generated two different positions on each policy issue. In the UK, this includes 9 issues (and 18 policy statements): tax and spending, government surveillance, healthcare and pension spending, military spending, government regulation on the economy, energy policy, immigration, and Brexit. In Germany, we pooled 10 issues (and 20 policy statements), including policy statements on the cooperation with(in) the EU (replacing those on Brexit) and on the controlled sale of cannabis. In Canada, we pooled 9 issues (and 18 policy statements) that are the same as the set used for Germany, save for the statements on the cooperation with(in) the EU. We randomly selected two from the set of policy statements, which were shown in Slots 4 and 5.

Slot 6 presents an additional piece of information on the target person's socio-economic characteristics. This listed characteristic is randomly selected from a pool of statements regarding education level (university degree/no university degree), religiosity (religious/non-religious), union membership (union member/non-member), area of residence (urban/rural/suburban), and social class (working/middle/upper).

Finally, note that the ordering of Slots 2 through 6 is randomized, but is held constant for each respondent over multiple trials.

Figure A4. Example of task screen and back-end data (UK)



A3. Questionnaire (Non-Experimental Part of the Survey)

In order to match our respondents with hypothetical individuals described in the experimental profiles, we included questions about respondents' partisanship, socio-demographic traits, values/beliefs, and policy stances. We list those questions from the UK survey as an example. Using responses to these questions, we then recode key variables that indicate whether the respondent shares a given characteristic with the target person.

Left-right self-placement

In politics, people sometimes talk of "Left" and "Right". Using the scale from 0 to 10, where would you place yourself and political parties listed below? Even if you are not completely sure, please give us your best guess. [most left (0)/ 1/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5/ 6/ 7/ 8/ 9/ most right (10)]

Partisanship (and strength of partisanship)

Regardless of which party you would vote for in any particular election, do you, generally speaking, identify with the Conservative Party, Labour Party, Liberal Democrats, or what? [Conservative/Labour/SNP/LibDem/Green/UKIP/Other/None]

Would you call yourself a very strong, fairly strong, or not very strong identifier of [PARTY]? [Very strong/Fairly strong/Not very strong]

Socio-demographic characteristics

* Age * What is your age?

* Gender * What is your gender? [male/female/prefer not to say]

* Education * What is the highest level of education that you have completed?

* Social class * Would you describe yourself as ...? [working class/middle class/upper-middle class/upper class/don't know]

* Area of residence * Which best describes the area where you live? [urban/suburban/rural]

* Religiosity * How religious would you say you are? [not at all religious (1)/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5/ 6/ very religious (7)/ don't know]

* Union membership * Are you or anyone in your household a member of a trade union or similar organization? [yes/no/don't know]

Value

* Income equality * Regarding **income equality**, some people believe that **society works better when wealth is more equally distributed**. Suppose that these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others believe that **society works better when those who are most productive get most of the wealth**. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

* Cultural diversity * Regarding **cultural diversity**, some people believe that **cultural diversity makes the nation stronger**. Suppose that these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others believe that **cultural diversity makes the nation weaker**. Suppose that these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

* Civil liberty * Regarding the values of **civil liberty and national security**, some people believe that **protecting civil liberties is more important than improving national security**. Suppose that these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others believe that **improving national security is more important than protecting civil liberties**. Suppose that these people are the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

* Government role* Regarding the **government's role in the management of the economy**, some people believe that **government should play a greater role in the management of the economy**. Suppose that these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others believe that **government should play a smaller role in the management of the economy**. Suppose that these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

* Gender equality * Regarding **gender equality**, some people believe that **men and women should be treated equally in economic and public life**. Suppose that these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others believe that **there are legitimate reasons to treat men and women differently in economic and public life**. Suppose that these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

Policy

* Tax and spend * On the issue of **Taxes versus Public Spending**, where would you place yourself? Please use a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means the government should cut taxes even if it leads to less public spending, and 7 means the government should not cut taxes if it leads to less public spending.

* Tax and debt * On the issue of **Taxes versus Public Debt**, where would you place yourself? Please use a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means the government should cut taxes even if it leads to more public debt, and 7 means the government should not cut taxes if it leads to more public debt.

* Health spending * On the issue of government spending on **Healthcare and Pensions**, where would you place yourself? Please use a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means government should allocate less resources to healthcare and pensions, and 7 means government should allocate more resources to healthcare and pensions.

* Immigration * On the issue of **Immigration**, where would you place yourself? Please use a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means supporting policies that increase immigration from non-Western countries, and 7 means not supporting such policies.

* Government market intervention * On the issue of **How Much the Government Should Regulate Financial Markets**, where would you place yourself? Please use a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means supporting policies that increase government regulation of financial markets, and 7 means supporting policies that decrease government regulation of financial markets.

* Brexit * On the issue of **Brexit**, where would you place yourself? Please use a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means supporting policies that would result in a “hard Brexit”, and 7 means opposing such policies.

* Surveillance * On the issue of **Prohibition of Government Surveillance**, where would you place yourself? Please use a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means supporting policies that prohibit government surveillance, and 7 means opposing such policies.

* Military spending * On the issue of **Military Spending**, where would you place yourself? Please use a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means government should spend less on the military, and 7 means government should spend more on the military.

* Energy policy * On the issue of **Renewable Energy**, where would you place yourself? Please use a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means support for taxing fossil fuels to promote renewable energy, and 7 means opposing such policies.

A4. Key Variables

Table A3. Partisanship


	N	Percent
Canada		
NDP	154	15.11
Conservative	309	30.72
Liberal	304	30.22
Green	77	7.65
Don't Know/Other	163	16.20
Germany		
CDU/CSU	149	14.81
SPD	122	12.13
FDP	68	6.76
AfD	134	13.32
Linke	112	11.13
Green	218	21.67
Don't Know/Other	203	20.18
UK		
Conservative	290	28.91
Labour	341	34.00
Liberal Democrats	91	9.07
SNP	26	2.59
Green	57	5.68
UKIP	80	7.98
Don't Know/Other	100	11.76

Table A4. Summary statistics for key variables used in the model

	N*	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Ideological distance	55510	2.622	2.140	0	10
Overlapping partisanship	60300	0.170	0.376	0	1
Number of overlapping socio-demographic char's	60300	1.146	0.816	0	3
<i>Gender overlap</i>	60300	0.503	0.500	0	1
<i>Age group overlap</i>	60300	0.256	0.436	0	1
<i>University degree overlap</i>	9496	0.500	0.500	0	1
<i>Social class overlap</i>	13581	0.336	0.472	0	1
<i>Residence overlap</i>	12536	0.379	0.485	0	1
<i>Religiousness overlap</i>	9411	0.499	0.316	0	1
<i>Union membership overlap</i>	9387	0.491	0.500	0	1
Overlapping value orientation	60300	0.500	0.325	0	1
Overlapping policy stances	60300	0.963	0.470	0	2

*N denotes the number of respondent-profile pairs.

Figure A5. Description of dependent variable by country (ideological distance between respondent and profile)



Appendix B. Additional Analyses and Robustness Checks

B1. Parsing out Projection Effects

Our first set of additional analyses examine the possibility that our findings may simply be artefacts of strong stereotyping effects.

We attempt to parse out the effect of projection by examining the extent to which a given overlapping characteristic appears to shift assumed ideology away from the mean ideological placement associated with that characteristic. In this alternative measure of (trait-specific) projection, we use mean ideological placements as a proxy for society-wide assumptions about that characteristic's political implications and then calculate the effect of a given overlapping characteristic on assumed ideological positions relative to that mean.

To carry out this investigation, we first estimated the predicted left-right (LR) ideological positions for each of the profile characteristics, and then calculated a new dependent variable indicating the distance between the respondent's placement of the target profile and the average location assessed by all respondents (where negative values = closer to respondent's own LR position = more projection). We then ran a series of bivariate regressions where the main independent variable was the presence/absence of a given shared socio-demographic characteristic (university degree, religiosity, union membership, urban residence, suburban residence, rural residence, gender, working class, middle class, upper class, young age group, mid-age group, and old-age group). Among the thirteen regressions, three of them showed statistically significant effects – religiosity, union membership, and university degree – and all others were statistically insignificant.

The results reported in Table B1 are based on the regression analysis, with errors clustered by respondent and country fixed effects included. Findings are robust across several other modelling choices we have also employed to assure robustness (e.g., regression without country fixed effects, random effects regression, and multilevel model where individuals are nested within country). Results highlight a consistent effect of sharing religiosity and trade union membership on projection, as well as a less robust effect of shared educational level. They thus also partly reflect the findings from the related subgroup analyses reported in below in Online Appendix B4.

Table B1. The effect of (selected) shared socio-economic characteristics on projection, using an alternative measure

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Shared characteristics in...			
<i>Education (University degree)</i>	-0.094* (0.049)		
<i>Religiosity</i>		-0.188** (0.081)	
<i>Union membership</i>			-0.124** (0.050)
Constant	0.040 (0.058)	0.242*** (0.067)	0.100* (0.057)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	8763	8682	8665
R-squared	0.001	0.002	0.001
Log Likelihood	-19610.5	-19365.7	-19304.6

Note: standard errors in parentheses; all models include country fixed effects and errors clustered by respondents. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Similarly, to test the effect of shared partisanship, we first estimated the average LR location of the profiles described with a given partisan affiliation and calculated the potential projection-induced “pull” compared to the average LR location. We then ran a series of bivariate regression to test the extent of pulling for each of the partisans (including non-partisan) by country.

Table B2 reports the results from these analyses. For example, in Canada, when the profiled individual is described as an NDP supporter, co-partisan respondents (i.e., NDP supporters) located the profile closer to themselves by 0.82 relative to the mean LR location of NDP profiles, when compared to non-NDP supporters.

We also note that effect sizes were non-trivial, ranging from 0.66 to 0.82 in Canada, 0.41 to 0.68 in Germany, and 0.33 to 0.75 in the UK. Nevertheless, the role of shared partisanship on projection is much less clear when it comes to positioning supporters of some smaller parties (i.e., Greens in Canada, Die Linke in Germany, SNP and Greens in the UK) or non-partisans (in Canada and Germany). This result is partly due to the small number of co-partisan cases in these instances (e.g., shared partisan cases for the SNP and Green party in the UK were less than 6% of the sample included in the regression). Importantly, however, the results – especially for the non-partisans and regional parties – partly reflect our argument related to the H3: namely, that the role of shared (non-) partisanship will be weakened in circumstances where no clearly identifiable party cues are available, since voters are less likely to be able to draw inferences about small and/or regional political parties.

Table B2. The effect of shared (non-)partisanship on projection, using an alternative measure

Country/ Party	Shared PID Coef.	Constant Coef.	N	R ²	Log-Likelihood
Canada					
NDP	-0.819*** (0.187)	0.097 (0.075)	1551	0.017	-3506.1
Cons	-0.655*** (0.108)	0.135** (0.066)	4417	0.016	-10094.7
Lib	-0.808*** (0.106)	0.256*** (0.067)	4582	0.025	-10463.8
BQ	0.931*** (0.074)	0.217*** (0.074)	1538	0.000	-3596.7
Green	-0.327 (0.278)	0.036 (0.073)	1448	0.001	-3304.6
None	0.024 (0.109)	0.022 (0.040)	4424	0.000	-9779.1
Germany					
CDU	-0.432*** (0.109)	0.100** (0.049)	3843	0.007	-7936.4
SPD	-0.405*** (0.117)	0.133*** (0.040)	3843	0.005	-7763.9
FDP	-0.461*** (0.137)	0.051 (0.042)	3913	0.004	-7890.8
AfD	-0.513** (0.237)	0.172* (0.091)	1233	0.006	-2764.2
Die Linke	-0.010 (0.261)	0.097 (0.082)	1305	0.000	-2880.7
Green	-0.679*** (0.146)	0.224*** (0.074)	1302	0.021	-2697.8
None	-0.139 (0.102)	0.019 (0.036)	3951	0.001	-8163.9
UK					
Cons	-0.451*** (0.080)	0.107** (0.044)	3628	0.009	-8034.4
Lab	-0.747*** (0.116)	0.374*** (0.066)	3676	0.023	-8245.6
LibDem	-0.333** (0.140)	0.122*** (0.043)	3609	0.002	-7621.3
SNP	0.259 (0.299)	0.138* (0.074)	1191	0.000	-2675.5
UKIP	-1.148*** (0.289)	0.169* (0.090)	1268	0.016	-2928.9
Green	-0.385 (0.267)	0.057 (0.075)	1192	0.002	-2668.4
None	-0.256* (0.132)	0.017 (0.041)	3596	0.001	-7835.0

Note: robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Overall, the results from these analyses thus reaffirm the importance of shared partisanship and the role of sharing certain socio-demographic traits – though with a notably more limited impact of socio-demographic characteristics. Findings thus broadly align with those from the main analysis.

B2. Partisan Heterogeneity

Next, we assessed the possibility that different partisan groups may perceive ideological distance in systematically different ways. Table B3 presents the relevant results, employing the modelling approach used in our main analyses but adding an interaction between respondent partisanship (a total of 18 categories, including one for non-partisans) and a dichotomous variable indicating whether the profile shares that partisanship (or non-partisanship) with the respondent. As elsewhere in the paper, the full model is built stepwise: Model 1 adds in only a partisanship-related variables (i.e., shared PID, respondents' PID (fixed effects) and an interaction between shared PID and respondents' PID; Model 2 adds in the other shared traits; and Model adds in control variables as well (i.e., respondents' socio-demographic traits). All models include country fixed effects and errors clustered by respondent.

Table B3. Interaction model results (interaction between respondents' PID and whether PID is shared)


	(1)	(2)	(3)
Shared characteristics in...			
<i>Partisanship</i>	-0.413*** (0.075)	-0.413*** (0.075)	-0.441*** (0.081)
<i>Socio-demo traits</i>		-0.017 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.012)
<i>Value</i>		-0.605*** (0.034)	-0.614*** (0.036)
<i>Policy stances</i>		-0.327*** (0.023)	-0.318*** (0.024)
Respondents' PID (ref: non-partisan)			
<i>uk_cons</i>	0.605*** (0.136)	0.597*** (0.136)	0.643*** (0.158)
<i>uk_lab</i>	0.909*** (0.137)	0.894*** (0.136)	0.846*** (0.159)
<i>uk_snp</i>	0.329 (0.276)	0.327 (0.276)	0.256 (0.284)
<i>uk_libdem</i>	0.136 (0.156)	0.124 (0.156)	0.108 (0.177)
<i>uk_green</i>	0.649*** (0.194)	0.652*** (0.194)	0.677*** (0.214)
<i>uk_ukip</i>	0.542** (0.213)	0.538** (0.212)	0.549** (0.235)
<i>can_ndp</i>	0.721*** (0.137)	0.702*** (0.136)	0.705*** (0.143)
<i>can_cons</i>	0.852*** (0.119)	0.847*** (0.118)	0.945*** (0.126)
<i>can_lib</i>	0.484*** (0.113)	0.477*** (0.113)	0.543*** (0.120)

<i>can_bq</i>	0.262*** (0.0824)	0.254*** (0.0817)	0.029 (0.118)
<i>can_green</i>	0.818*** (0.217)	0.809*** (0.215)	0.792*** (0.224)
<i>de_cdu</i>	-0.263** (0.127)	-0.285** (0.127)	-0.254* (0.138)
<i>de_spd</i>	0.183 (0.143)	0.165 (0.143)	0.166 (0.149)
<i>de_fdp</i>	-0.295** (0.143)	-0.294** (0.143)	-0.288* (0.150)
<i>de_afd</i>	0.748*** (0.159)	0.740*** (0.158)	0.805*** (0.171)
<i>de_linke</i>	1.303*** (0.159)	1.289*** (0.159)	1.283*** (0.170)
<i>de_green</i>	-0.103 (0.119)	-0.113 (0.119)	-0.109 (0.129)
Interactions: Shared PID x Partisanship (ref: non-partisan)			
<i>uk_cons</i>	-0.547*** (0.117)	-0.552*** (0.116)	-0.531*** (0.121)
<i>uk_lab</i>	-0.399*** (0.121)	-0.386*** (0.120)	-0.350*** (0.128)
<i>uk_snp</i>	-0.200 (0.370)	-0.242 (0.360)	-0.172 (0.358)
<i>uk_libdem</i>	-0.246* (0.146)	-0.246* (0.145)	-0.247 (0.153)
<i>uk_green</i>	-0.141 (0.239)	-0.155 (0.235)	-0.209 (0.243)
<i>uk_ukip</i>	-0.425 (0.362)	-0.423 (0.360)	-0.366 (0.376)
<i>can_ndp</i>	-0.213 (0.181)	-0.220 (0.179)	-0.147 (0.188)
<i>can_cons</i>	-0.725*** (0.127)	-0.724*** (0.127)	-0.745*** (0.131)
<i>can_lib</i>	-0.307*** (0.109)	-0.310*** (0.109)	-0.299*** (0.116)
<i>can_bq</i>	-0.199*** (0.0752)	-0.261*** (0.0753)	-0.230*** (0.081)
<i>can_green</i>	-0.319 (0.269)	-0.321 (0.269)	-0.301 (0.273)
<i>de_cdu</i>	-0.153 (0.116)	-0.154 (0.116)	-0.120 (0.121)
<i>de_spd</i>	-0.374*** (0.145)	-0.374*** (0.144)	-0.306** (0.148)
<i>de_fdp</i>	-0.153 (0.134)	-0.148 (0.132)	-0.068 (0.139)
<i>de_afd</i>	-0.755*** (0.242)	-0.733*** (0.236)	-0.878*** (0.218)
<i>de_linke</i>	-0.701*** (0.244)	-0.680*** (0.236)	-0.623** (0.255)
<i>de_green</i>	-0.308**	-0.302**	-0.270**

	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.126)
Controls (respondents' traits)			
Age			0.004*** (0.002)
Male			-0.051 (0.050)
University degree			-0.018 (0.053)
Middle class (ref: Working)			-0.129** (0.055)
Upper-middle class			-0.051 (0.083)
Upper class			-0.052 (0.306)
Suburban (ref: Urban)			-0.117** (0.052)
Rural			-0.042 (0.079)
Religiosity			-0.012 (0.014)
Union membership			0.073 (0.065)
Constant	2.349*** (0.0824)	3.004*** (0.0904)	3.335*** (0.131)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	55510	55510	50780
R-squared	0.0549	0.0685	0.0728
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01			

Given that this approach requires additional computations to estimate the effect of “shared PID” (given the interaction term), we also illustrate the marginal effect of shared PID conditional on respondents’ PID in Figure B1. Results replicate the findings from our main analyses: notwithstanding some modest variation in the effect sizes, it is difficult to discern any theoretically interesting patterns across partisan groups – aside from noting that the differences are not statistically significant in three partisan groups that had small subsample sizes in our data.

Figure B1. Marginal effect of shared PID (with predicted values), conditional on respondents' PID



B3. The Role of Political Interest

For our third hypothesis, we suggested that the availability of a partisanship cue could be operationalized differently, as explained in the robustness checks section. Instead of the availability of the target person's partisanship label, it could be that the respondent's ability to make use of such cues (as measured by political interest) will vary the effect of shared partisanship on projection.

Table B4 shows the relevant results for the test of H3. For the group with high political interest, the test of equality shows the effect of shared socio-demographic characteristics is statistically indistinguishable when making inferences about a target person who is either partisan or non-partisan.

This is not the case, however, for the group with lower political interest – as per our expectation that H3 would apply most strongly among low-interest individuals. Supporting this expectation, the effect of socio-demographic similarity becomes larger and significant when these respondents assess a target person who is non-partisan, such that they perceive the person to be ideologically closer when sharing more socio-demographic traits. This difference in the coefficients, from 0.029 to -0.087, is significant in the test of equality.

Table B4. Subsample analysis: Varying effects of shared partisanship and socio-demographic similarity, by respondents' level of political interest

	Respondents with high level of political interest			Respondents with low level of political interest		
	Partisan profile (1)	Non-partisan profile (2)	Test of equality (1) vs (2)	Partisan profile (3)	Non-partisan profile (4)	Test of equality (3) vs (4)
Shared characteristics in...						
<i>Partisanship</i>	-1.173*** (0.061)	-0.839*** (0.193)	No diff	-0.624*** (0.082)	-0.571*** (0.135)	Diff**
<i>Soc-demo</i>	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.018 (0.044)		0.029 (0.029)	-0.087* (0.050)	
<i>Value</i>	-0.693*** (0.063)	-1.082*** (0.112)		-0.390*** (0.081)	-0.449*** (0.150)	
<i>Policy stances</i>	-0.412*** (0.043)	-0.373*** (0.079)		-0.303*** (0.057)	-0.285*** (0.099)	
Constant	4.387*** (0.116)	3.916*** (0.158)		3.201*** (0.116)	3.110*** (0.172)	
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
Observations	15153	4037		9606	2684	
R-squared	0.078	0.056		0.020	0.025	

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Respondents who stated that they were “very interesting” in politics are categorized as having a high level of political interest (32.2%), respondents who stated that they were “little interested” or “not at all interested” in politics are categorized as having a low level of political interest (25.8%). Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 are OLS regression model with country fixed effects and errors clustered by respondent. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

B4. Subgroup Analysis by Socio-Demographic Trait

In our main analysis, we tested our third hypothesis using pooled data and a variable that captured the number of shared socio-demographic characteristics. It is nevertheless likely that the impact of socio-demographic characteristics will vary. To shed light on any such variation, we conducted follow-up analyses to test the effect of socio-demographic traits individually (instead of the sum of the shared traits). This involved a series of regressions run on sample subsets (presented in Table B5), restricted to observations where profile descriptions included a given socio-demographic trait. We then replicated Models 4 and 5 (in Table 1 in main text): the former for partisan profiles, and the latter for non-partisan profiles.

Among the seven socio-demographic traits used in the profile – namely, age, gender, education (university degree), residence, social class, union membership, and religiosity – we found that social class and religiosity appear to have mattered in the way anticipated by H3: that is, sharing these socio-demographic traits did not have a meaningful effect on projection when partisan cues were available (as shown in Model 4), but their effects became statistically significant (and/or the effect size grew) when partisan cues were not available in the profile (Model 5). Other traits (not reported here) did not show a significant difference between the models or were statistically insignificant.

Table B5. The varying effect of shared social class and shared religiosity for partisan profiles (Model 4) and non-partisan profiles (Model 5)

	Social Class		Religiosity	
	Partisan profiles (Model 4)	Non-partisan profiles (Model 5)	Partisan profiles (Model 4)	Non-partisan profiles (Model 5)
Shared characteristics in...				
<i>Partisanship</i>	-0.953*** (0.057)	-0.659*** (0.126)	-0.921*** (0.066)	-0.719*** (0.146)
<i>Social class</i>	-0.005 (0.047)	-0.260*** (0.083)		
<i>Religiosity</i>			-0.181** (0.088)	-0.359** (0.155)
<i>Value</i>	-0.555*** (0.071)	-0.827*** (0.132)	-0.596*** (0.089)	-0.940*** (0.160)
<i>Policy stances</i>	-0.317*** (0.049)	-0.431*** (0.088)	-0.234*** (0.060)	-0.371*** (0.119)
Constant	3.753*** (0.091)	3.521*** (0.144)	3.679*** (0.111)	3.713*** (0.194)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9841	2701	6764	1918

R-squared	0.046	0.040	0.046	0.050
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Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Results from OLS regression models with country fixed effects and errors clustered by respondent. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

B5. Alternative Modelling Approaches

The main results reported in Table 1 of the paper are based on OLS regression models with errors clustered by respondent. We have also run the full model analyses (Model 3 in Table 1) using alternative regression models, and we report the results in Table B6 for: a naïve OLS regression (Model 2), a random effects regression model using GLS estimator (Model 3), and a multilevel model (MLM) where we allow random intercepts at the country level and at the respondent level (Model 4). Models 1, 2, and 3 also include binary country variables (country fixed effects).

Table B6. Replication of Model 3 in Table 1

	Robust error (1)	Naïve OLS (2)	Random effects (3)	MLM (4)
Shared characteristics in...				
<i>Partisanship</i>	-0.818*** (0.031)	-0.818*** (0.024)	-0.794*** (0.020)	-0.794*** (0.020)
<i>Socio-demo traits</i>	-0.016 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.011)	-0.024** (0.009)	-0.024*** (0.009)
<i>Value</i>	-0.608*** (0.035)	-0.608*** (0.027)	-0.590*** (0.023)	-0.590*** (0.023)
<i>Policy stances</i>	-0.331*** (0.023)	-0.331*** (0.019)	-0.312*** (0.016)	-0.312*** (0.016)
Constant	3.594*** (0.059)	3.594*** (0.031)	3.537*** (0.046)	3.366*** (0.099)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	--	--
Random intercepts (variance)				
<i>Country</i>				-1.822*** (0.433)
<i>Individual</i>				0.186*** (0.014)
<i>Residual</i>				0.540*** (0.003)
Observations	55510	55510	55510	55510
R-squared	0.0396	0.0396	0.0396	
Log-likelihood	-119884.7	-119884.7		-112215.6

Note: Model 1 shows the results reported in Model 3 of Table 1, from a regression model with errors clustered by respondent; Model 2 from a naïve OLS regression model; Model 3 from a GLS random effects regression model; Model 4 from a hierarchical multilevel model (two-level random intercepts model with individual respondents are nested within countries). Models 1, 2 and 3 include country fixed effects (binary country variables). Standard errors in parentheses.
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.