Supplementary Information for:

Gender Inclusivity and Perceptions of Party Ideology: Observational and Experimental Evidence

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Appendix A: Observational Data

Table A1. Countries, Parties, and Elections included in the Study


Britain (1997, 2001, 2005, 2015, 2017)		**Netherlands (1998,2002,2006,2010, 2017)**
LAB Labour Party		CDA Christian Democratic Appeal
LibDem Liberal Democrats		SGP Political Reformed Party
CON Conservative Party		D66 Democrats 66
PC Plaid Cymru		GL Green Left
SNP Scottish National Party		PvdA Labour Party
UKIP United Kingdom Independence Party*		SP Socialist Party
GP Green Party		VVD People's Party for Freedom & Dem
		CU Christian Union
Denmark (1998, 2001, 2007)		LPF List Pim Fortuyn*
CD Centre Democrats		PVV Party of Freedom*
KF Conservatives People's Party		PvdD Party for the Animals
SD Social Democratic Party		
SF Socialist People's Party		**Spain (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008)**
V Liberal Party		PP People's Party
EL Red-Green Unity List		IU United Left
RV Danish People's Party*		PSOE Socialist Workers' Party
KrF Christian People's Party		CiU Convergence and Union
		PNV/EAJ Basque Nationalist Party
Finland (2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019)		ERC Republican Left of Catalonia
KD Christian Democratic Party		EA Basque Solidarity
		CDS Centre Democrats
KESK Centre Party		CC Canarian Coalition
KOK National Coalition Party		
RKP/SFP Swedish People's Party		**Portugal (2002, 2005, 2009, 2015, 2019)**
SSDP Social Democratic Party		CDS-PP Dem. & Soc Centre+People's Party
VAS Left Alliance		PSP Socialist Party
VIHR Green League		PSD Social Democratic Party
PS True Finns*		BE Left Bloc
SIN Blue Reform		CDU Unitarian Democratic Coalition
		PAN People, Animals, and Nature
Germany (1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017)		CH Enough
CDU Christian Democrats		IL Liberal Initiative
FDP Free Democratic Party		L Free
GRUNEN Green Party		
PDS/LINKE Party of Dem Socialism		**Sweden 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2018)**
SPD Social Democratic Party		V Left Party
AfD Alternative for Germany*		SAP Social Democrats
CSU Christian Social Union		FP People's Party
FW Free Voters		MP Green Party

		M Moderate Party
France (2002, 2007, 2012, 2017)		SD Sweden Democrats*
EELV Green Party		KD Christian Democrats
UDF Union for French Democracy		C Centre Party
PS Socialist Party		L Liberals
FN National Front*		FI Feminist Initiative
RPR Rally for the Republic		
MoDem Movement for Democracy		**Norway (1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017)**
UMP Union for a Popular Movement		SV Left Socialists
PG Left Party		DNA Labour Party
FDP Liberal Democrats		V Liberal Party
GP Green Party		KrF Christian People's Party
SP Social Democrats		H Conservative Party
LaREM The Republic Onwards		SP Centre Party
LR The Republicans		Red Electoral Alliance
FI Indomitable France		FrP Progress Party*
DLF France Arise		MDG The Greens
		R Red
Canada (1997, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015)		
BQ Bloc Quebecois		**New Zealand (1996, 2002, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017, 2020)**
CP Conservative Party		ACT New Zealand
LP Liberal Party		GP Green Party
PC Progressive Conservatives		LP Labour Party
ND New Democratic Party		MP Maori Party
GP Green Party		NP National Party
		MANA Movement
Australia (1996, 2004, 2007, 2013, 2017)		NZFP New Zealand First Party
ALP Australian Labor Party		UFNZ United Future New Zealand
AG Australian Greens		TOP The Opportunities Party
LPA Liberal Party of Australia		NC New Conservative
NPA National Party of Australia		
AD Australian Democrats		**Iceland (1999, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2013, 2017)**
PP Palmer Party		VGB Left Green Movement
UAP United Australia Party		FF Liberal party
PHON One Nation		Sj Independence Party
		F Progressive Party
United States (1996, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020)		P Pirate Party
Democratic Party		So United Socialist Party
Republican Party		M Centre Party
Austria (2008, 2013, 2017)		FIF People's Party
GA Green Alternative		Reform Party
SPO Austrian Social Democratic Party		Bright Future
OVP Austrian People's Party		

KPO Communist Party of Austria		**Israel (1996, 2003, 2006, 2013, 2020)**
VdU League of Independents		HaAvoda Labour Party
FPO Austrian Freedom Party*		MERETZ Mapam-Ratz
BZO Alliance for the Future of Austria*		Shinui Change
NEOS New Austria and Liberal Forum		MAFDAL National Religious Party
TS Team Stronach for Austria		SHAS Sephardi Torah Guardians
PILZ Peter Pilz List		Blue and White
		Likud Union
Greece (2009, 2012, 2015)		National Union
KKE Communist Party of Greece		The Jewish Home*
SYRIZA Coalition of the Radical Left		Joint List
PASOK Panhellenic Socialist Movement		YH United Torah Judaism
ND New Democracy		EMET Labor-Gesher-Meretz
ANEL Independent Greeks*		YB Israel Is Our Home
LS-XA Golden Dawn*		Yamina
The River		
ANEL National Patriotic Alliance		**Switzerland (1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2019)**
Union of Centrists		CVP Christian Democrats
		FDP Liberal Democrats
Italy (2018)		GP Green Party
M5S Five Star Movement		SP Social Democrats
PD Democratic Party		SVP Swiss People's Party*
LN League		EVP Evangelical People's Party
FI Go Italy		GLP Green Liberal Party
FdI Brothers of Italy		LT Ticino League
LeU Free and Equal		BDP Conservative Democratic Party
Ireland (2002, 2007, 2011, 2016)		
SF Sinn Fein		
FG Fine Gael		
GP Green Party		
LP Labour Party		
FF Fianna Fail		
AAA-PBP Alliance-People Before Profit		
SD Social Democrats		
RI Renew Ireland		


Notes. The table lists the countries, parties, and election years that were included in our empirical analyses of survey respondents' left-right party placements.

Figure A1. Women's Representation in Party Parliamentary Delegations in 21 Democracies (1996-2020), by Party-Family



Notes. The figure displays the distribution of the proportions of women MPs in the parliamentary delegations of all party-years in our study and by party-family.

Figure A2. Proportion of Women Party Supporters Across 21 Western Publics (1996-2020), by Party-Family



Notes. The figure displays the distribution of the proportions of each party's supporters who were women (as a proportion of the CSES respondents who reported voting for the party in the current election year), for all party-years in our study and by party-family.

Table A2. Models Estimated Separately on Women and Men Respondents (Columns 2-3), and then on Earlier and Later Time Periods (Columns 4-5)

	All cases (1)	Women respondents (2)	Men respondents (3)	Elections 1996-2007 (4)	Elections 2008-2020 (5)
party j's leader is a woman ($t-1$)	-0.27 (0.20)	-0.25 (0.19)	-0.29 (0.21)	-0.22 (0.23)	-0.34 (0.26)
party j's proportion of women MPs ($t-1$)	-1.41** (0.51)	-1.34** (0.50)	-1.47** (0.53)	0.51 (0.79)	-2.19** (0.68)
party j's proportion of women supporters (t)	-2.01* (0.83)	-1.61* (0.80)	-2.36* (0.85)	-1.20 (0.83)	-3.51** (1.12)
party j has a candidate gender quota (t)	-1.25** (0.22)	-1.31** (0.23)	-1.18** (0.21)	-1.24*** (0.21)	-1.33** (0.36)
party j's left-right manifesto coding (t)	1.32** (0.13)	1.31** (0.13)	1.34** (0.13)	1.59*** (0.15)	1.16*** (0.19)
Election fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
RMSE	2.38	2.44	2.31	2.23	2.45
Adjusted R2	0.32	0.31	0.35	0.35	0.32

** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$: two-tailed tests.

Notes. The dependent variable, [*respondent i's left-right placement of out-party j* (t)], is the placement of the party on a 0-10 scale (0= Left, 10=Right) that the survey respondent assigned to party *j* in the election survey administered at time *t*. The independent variables are described in the text. The OLS regression models were estimated with standard errors clustered on elections. All models include election fixed effects.

Table A3. Models Estimated Separately on Left-Wing and Right-wing Parties' Supporters (Columns 2-3), and then on Respondents' Placements of Left-Wing and Right-Wing Parties (Columns 4-5)

	All cases (1)	Left-wing parties' supporters (2)	Right-wing parties' supporters (3)	Left-wing party placements (4)	Right-wing party placements (5)
party j's leader is a woman ($t-1$)	-0.27 (0.20)	-0.36 (0.21)	-0.18 (0.24)	-0.33 (0.19)	-0.59 (0.41)
party j's proportion of women MPs ($t-1$)	-1.41** (0.51)	-1.30* (0.65)	-1.58** (0.56)	-0.72 (0.53)	-2.75** (0.96)
party j's proportion of women supporters (t)	-2.01* (0.83)	-1.44 (1.00)	-2.79** (0.99)	-1.94 (1.10)	-2.83* (1.38)
party j has a candidate gender quota (t)	-1.25** (0.22)	-1.55*** (0.28)	-1.12*** (0.25)	-1.36** (0.50)	-0.47 (0.31)
party j's left-right manifesto coding (t)	1.32** (0.13)	1.43*** (0.19)	1.33*** (0.12)	2.13*** (0.32)	1.17*** (0.17)
Election fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
RMSE	2.38	2.40	2.32	2.15	2.41
Adjusted R2	0.32	0.34	0.35	0.30	0.23

** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$: two-tailed tests.

Notes. The dependent variable, [*respondent i's left-right placement of out-party j* (t)], is the placement of the party on a 0-10 scale (0= Left, 10=Right) that the survey respondent assigned to party *j* in the election survey administered at time *t*. The independent variables are described in the text. The OLS regression models were estimated with standard errors clustered on elections. All models include election fixed effects.

The estimates reported in columns 2-3 are those on survey respondents who reported supporting a left-wing party (column 2) and on respondents who reported supporting a right-wing party (column 3), with parties classified as left or right based on whether their RILE score was above or below the median score of all the parties in our sample. The estimates reported in columns 4-5 are those on survey respondents' placements of all the left-wing parties in our study (column 4) and on respondents' placements of all the right-wing parties in our study (column 5), with parties again classified based on whether their RILE score was above or below the median score of the parties in our study.

Table A4. Accounting for Individual Fixed Effects (N=609,935)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
***party j's leader is a woman* (*t* – 1)**	**-0.56* (0.23)**				**-0.25 (0.19)**
***party j's proportion of women MPs* (*t* – 1)**		**-2.35** (0.59)**			**-1.32* (0.51)**
***party j's proportion of women supporters* (*t*)**			**-3.65** (1.01)**		**-2.06* (0.82)**
***party j has a candidate gender quota* (*t*)**				**1.55** (0.25)**	**-1.25** (0.23)**
party j's left-right manifesto coding (*t*)	**1.59** (0.11)**	**1.48** (0.13)**	**1.47** (0.13)**	**1.44** (0.11)**	**-1.28** (0.13)**
Individual-level fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
RMSE	2.11	2.09	2.09	2.07	2.04
Adjusted R2	0.31	0.32	0.32	0.34	0.35

** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$: two-tailed tests.

Notes. The dependent variable, [*respondent i's left-right placement of out-party j* (*t*)], is the placement of the party on a 0-10 scale (0= Left, 10=Right) that the survey respondent assigned to party *j* in the election survey administered at time *t*. The independent variables are described in the text. The OLS regression models were estimated with standard errors clustered on elections.

Table A5. Accounting for Respondents' Levels of Political Knowledge

	High-knowledge respondents (1)	Low-knowledge respondents (2)
***party j's leader is a woman* (*t* – 1)**	-0.98* (0.41)	-0.42† (0.24)
***party j's proportion of women MPs* (*t* – 1)**	-1.10 (0.75)	-1.22* (0.56)
***party j's proportion of women supporters* (*t*)**	-3.04* (1.21)	-1.10 (1.06)
***party j has a candidate gender quota* (*t*)**	-1.47** (0.29)	-1.16** (0.23)
party j's left-right manifesto coding (*t*)	1.20** (0.19)	1.20*** (0.17)
Number of observations	132,041	270, 680
Election fixed effects	YES	YES
Adjusted R2	0.36	0.28

† p <0.10 ; * p < 0.05 ; ** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.

Notes. The dependent variable, [*respondent i's left-right placement of out-party j* (*t*)], is the placement of the party on a 0-10 scale (0=Left, 10=Right) that the survey respondent assigned to party *j* in the election survey administered at time *t*. The IVs are described in the text. The OLS regression models were estimated with standard errors clustered on elections.

For these analyses, the respondent's level of political knowledge was measured using the number of correct answers they provided to the questions included in the political knowledge quiz that was incorporated into surveys from Waves 1-4 of the CSES. (The knowledge quiz was not included in the Wave 5 surveys – from 2017 onwards – so that we cannot include these surveys in our analyses.) Respondents whose correct responses exceeded the survey median were defined as high-knowledge; others were defined as low knowledge.

Table A6. Model Estimates from CHES Data

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
party j's leader is a woman (t –1)	-0.88* (0.43)			
party j's proportion of women MPs (t – 1)		-4.01* (1.73)		
party j's proportion of women supporters (t)			-2.20 (1.77)	
Binding quota				-1.32** (0.38)
elite right-left placement of party j (t)	1.98*** (0.30)	1.74*** (0.35)	1.92*** (0.33)	1.76*** (0.35)
Number of observations	232	232	232	232
Adjusted R^2	0.447	0.470	0.430	0.465
RMSE	1.47	1.44	1.50	1.45
Election fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes. *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$; Standard errors in parentheses. The OLS regression models were estimated with standard errors clustered by country.

Table A7. Multilevel (Random country-year and individual intercepts) Model

To test the robustness of our results to alternative specifications, we also run a multi-level model with random country-year and respondent intercepts. This model takes account of the fact that respondents are clustered in country-years, and appear multiple times in the data. It produces extremely similar results to our fixed-effects specification in the main text.

Variable	ML Coef.	FE Coef	FE Clust. SE	ML3 Boot. SE
Female leader (t-1)	-0.27	-0.27	0.195	0.190
Proportion women MPs (t-1)	-1.40	-1.41	0.512	0.508
Proportion women supporters (t)	-2.01	-2.01	0.826	0.825
Binding quota	-1.25	-1.24	0.224	0.230
RILE placement (t)	1.32	1.32	0.131	0.130

Notes. Comparison of standard error estimates from three-level multilevel models. FE Clust. SE = Fixed effects with clustered standard errors on country-year. ML3 Boot. SE = Cluster bootstrap standard errors (B = 1,000 resamples, resampling country-year clusters; 1000/1000 converged). The close correspondence between FE clustered SEs and ML3 bootstrap SEs validates the standard error estimates reported in the main text.

Table A8. Removing Evaluations of Smaller Parties (N=505,639)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
***party j's proportion of women MPs* (*t* – 1)**	-3.13** (0.70)				-2.05** (0.52)
***party j's leader is a woman* (*t* – 1)**			-0.32 (0.17)		0.05 (0.13)
***party j has a candidate gender quota* (*t*)**		-1.62** (0.25)			-1.22** (0.22)
***party j's proportion of women supporters* (*t*)**				-5.64** (1.25)	-3.54* (1.06)
party j's left-right manifesto coding (*t*)	1.62** (0.12)	1.64** (0.09)	1.82** (0.11)	1.63** (0.11)	1.41** (0.12)
Election fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
RMSE	2.32	2.30	2.35	2.32	2.28
Adjusted R2	0.36	0.37	0.35	0.36	0.39

** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$; two-tailed tests.

Notes. The dependent variable is respondent *i*'s placement of party *j* in election year *t* on a 0–10 left-right scale (0 = left, 10 = right). Independent variables are described in the text. OLS models include country-election fixed effects and standard errors clustered by election. Parties with fewer than 50 supporters in the CSES dataset are removed reduce the possibility that smaller parties bias the estimates of the gender composition of parties.

Appendix B: Conjoint Items and Survey Information

B1. Conjoint Items: attribute categories, attributes, and levels

The hypothetical new party's attribute statements that we included in the study were presented to respondents in four "slots." Table B1 below provides the exact wording of each attribute statement we used and its allocation to a given attribute category and slot, which makes clear which attribute statements could be seen together (i.e., only those in different slots could appear together).

Table B1. Attribute categories, attributes, and attribute levels

Slot 3 (Cooperation)	
Attribute category: Cooperation	**Levels**
Cooperates with [TARGET PARTY 1[1]]	Often cooperates/ Seldom cooperates with [TARGET PARTY 1]
Cooperates with [TARGET PARTY 2]	Often cooperates/ Seldom cooperates with [TARGET PARTY 2]
Cooperates with [TARGET PARTY 3]	Often cooperates/ Seldom cooperates with [TARGET PARTY 3]
Cooperates with [TARGET PARTY 4]	Often cooperates/ Seldom cooperates with [TARGET PARTY 4]
Cooperates with [TARGET PARTY 5]	Often cooperates/ Seldom cooperates with [TARGET PARTY 5]
Cooperates with [TARGET PARTY …]	Often cooperates/ Seldom cooperates with [TARGET PARTY …]
Slot 4 (Policies and Values)	
Attribute category: Policies	**Levels**
Tax vs public spending	Support/ Oppose cutting taxes even if it leads to less public spending
Tax vs public debt	Support/ Oppose cutting taxes even if it leads to more public debt
Regulation of financial markets	Support/ Oppose increasing govt regulation of financial markets
Military spending	Support/ Oppose increasing govt spending of the military
Tax on fossil fuels	Support/ Oppose increasing taxation of fossil fuels

[1] Target party indicates existing parties in the given party system that are the target of cooperation. Target parties used in our experiment are: [Canada]: Cons, Lib, NDP, BQ, Green, [Germany]: CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, AfD, Green, Linke, [Denmark]: Ven (Liberals), Sd (Social Democrats), DF (Danish People), Enh (Red-Green Alliance), Lib (Liberal Alliance), RadVen (Social Liberal), SF (Socialist People), KF (Conservative People), Alt (Alternative), NB (New Right), [UK]: Cons, Lab, Libdem, SNP, UKIP, Green.

Welfare spending	Support/ Oppose to increase public spending on healthcare and pensions[2]
Immigration	Support/ Oppose limiting non-Western immigration
Surveillance in public spaces	Support/ Oppose limiting govt surveillance in public spaces
Legalization of marijuana use (CA, DE, DK)	Support/ Oppose legalization of marijuana use
EU (DE, DK)	Support/ Oppose strengthening cooperation in the EU
Brexit (UK)	Support/ Oppose policies that result in hard Brexit
Attribute category: Values	**Levels**
Income redistribution	Society works better when wealth is more equally distributed/ Society works better when those who are most productive get most of the wealth
Cultural diversity	Cultural diversity makes the nation stronger/ Cultural diversity makes the nation weaker
Civil liberty	Protecting civil liberties is more important than improving national security/ Improving national security is more important than protecting civil liberties
Government's role	Government should play a greater role in the management of the economy/ Government should play a smaller role […]
Gender inclusivity	Men and women should be treated equally in economic and public life/ There are legitimate reasons to treat men and women differently in economic and public life
Slot 5 (Social Group)	
Attribute category: Social group support	**Levels**
Men/ Women/ Older voters/ Younger voters/ Union households/ University graduates/ Rural voters/ Urban voters/ Suburban voters[3]/ Religious voters/ Working class voters/ Middle class voters/ Upper class voters/ Voters in Quebec (CA)	Strong support/ Weak support among [SOCIAL GROUP]
Slot 6 (Size, Scope, and Gender)	
Attribute category: Gender composition	**Levels**
Proportion of female candidates	10%/ 30%/ 50%/ 70% of the party's candidates are women

[2] In Denmark, the statement only describes a party's position on old-age pensions.

[3] On the advice of our German colleagues and translators, we do not show suburban voters' support category in Germany.

Gender quota	Party rule that requires 30%/ 50% female candidates
Attribute category: Party size	**Levels**
Party size	Expected to gain no seats/ to be the 3rd largest party/ to be the 4th largest party/ to be the 5th largest party in the next General (Federal) election
Attribute: Geographical support	**Levels**
Geographical scope of party support	Draw most of its support from only one region of the country/ Draws support from many different regions of the country

* CA: Canada, DE: Germany, DK: Denmark, UK: Great Britain

B2. The Cases and Survey

The surveys were administered on the Qualtrics platform and samples were recruited from Qualtrics LLC's online panels. We selected Canada, Denmark, Germany, and the United Kingdom to capture meaningful variation in how gender is institutionalized and politicized across advanced democracies. In Canada, where women held roughly 50% of parliamentary seats at the time of the survey, gender equality was strongly promoted—most notably through Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's 2015 gender-balanced cabinet initiative, which symbolized a broader commitment to parity. Denmark, with 42.9% female MPs in 2019, exemplifies the Nordic consensus model, characterized by deeply embedded egalitarian norms and broad cross-party support for gender equality (Raaum 2006). In Germany, where about 40% of MPs were women, gender equality has been mainstreamed through party quota reforms (Xydias 2014) but recently re-politicized by the AfD's anti-gender rhetoric, which has reintroduced gender into ideological conflict (Wallaschek et al. 2024). Finally, the United Kingdom, where women comprised approximately 34% of MPs, reflects comparatively lower descriptive representation and persistent institutional barriers. Drawing on Norris and Lovenduski's (1995) political recruitment framework, the UK case illustrates how supply-side factors (e.g., gendered divisions of labor) and demand-side factors (e.g., selectorate bias) continue to shape women's underrepresentation (Kenny 2013). These cross-national differences provide leverage to test whether gender functions as a consistent or context-dependent heuristic in citizens' left–right judgments of parties.

Our participants were not informed in advance that the survey was about politics and quotas were imposed on age and gender to match population targets in each country. Survey non-compliance was identified using a variety of strategies (e.g., straight-liners and speeders) and these respondents were excluded from the sample. Tables B2-B3 provide additional information.

Table B2. Survey fieldwork and samples

Country	Fieldwork	Sample
Canada	Mar. 26 - May 1, 2019	1000
Denmark	Oct. 30 - Nov. 30, 2019	1278
Germany	Aug. 8 - Sep. 5, 2019	1017
United Kingdom	Jan. 24 - Feb. 5, 2019	995

Table B3. Descriptive Statistics

		Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Canada	Male	0.5	0.5	0	1	1000
	Age	48.47	17.11	18	76	1000
	Education	6.793	1.5	1	10	1000
	Pol. Interest	2.857	0.89	1	4	1000
Denmark	Male	0.481	0.5	0	1	1278
	Age	46.053	16.52	18	76	1278
	Education	5.686	2.27	1	10	1269
	Pol. Interest	2.927	0.85	1	4	1278
Germany	Male	0.502	0.5	0	1	1017
	Age	48.143	16.47	18	76	1017
	Education	5.695	1.572	1	10	1017
	Pol. Interest	3.251	0.85	1	4	1017
UK	Male	0.501	0.5	0	1	995
	Age	48.143	16.49	18	76	995
	Education	3.887	1.2	1	6	995
	Pol. Interest	2.975	0.85	1	4	995

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Appendix C: Estimation Methods and Design Diagnostics

C1. Rescaling of Estimates

AMCEs can be estimated in a number of different ways that are asymptotically equivalent. In our case, we first stack the data so that a row is a respondent-trial and includes the DV (the inferred left-right position of the hypothetical new party on a given trial) and five factor variables indicating the attribute category and level that the respondent saw (on that trial) in each slot. Next, we choose an arbitrary baseline attribute level in each slot and either ran a regression on our DV with dummy variables for each factor (as Hainmueller et al. 2014 recommends) or used Egami and Imai (2018)'s CausalAnova procedure. Both procedures are asymptotically equivalent to a simple difference in means estimator (Egami and Imai 2018, p. 535) in which one averages the value of the DV for cases that saw a given attribute and subtracts the average of the DV for those that saw the baseline condition (i.e., marginalizing over the other attributes and levels the respondent saw in the other slots). As one would expect, given our large samples, these different procedures produce nearly identical estimates in our case. Thus, we report the ones from the regression procedure in the tables and graphs (unless otherwise indicated).

Furthermore, while the AMCEs "require the specification of baseline conditions, the relative magnitude is not sensitive to this choice" (Egami and Imai 2018). As such, one is free to report relative quantities that are best suited to the substantive goals of the research. This is useful in our case because all of the attributes of interest in this paper were designed to have only two levels (e.g., "seldom cooperates with X" or "often cooperates with X") even though multiple such pairs were allocated to the same "slot" (as described in Appendix B). We did include attributes that had more than two levels – proportion of female candidates and party size – and the estimates for these attributes are produced by choosing an appropriate baseline.

For those attributes with two levels, we choose to present the results with more substantively meaningful differences: for example, between "often" and "seldom" cooperating with the conservatives, rather than presenting the results, for example, of "often cooperating with the Conservatives" relative to the arbitrary baseline that we had chosen for "slot 1." That is, once we have estimated the effect of "often cooperating with the conservatives" (relative to the arbitrary slot 1 baseline) and "seldom cooperating with the conservatives (relative to that same baseline), the difference in these two estimates is the effect of "often cooperating with the conservatives" relative to "seldom cooperating with the conservatives" (where the baseline cancels out).

C2. Robustness Checks

There are several robustness checks that should be done for any conjoint study in order to examine how well the assumptions of the design hold. Hainmueller et al. (2014) point to several such assumptions and how they can be tested. For example, they explain that causal identification in a conjoint design requires the assumption of no "carryover" effects. A carryover effect occurs (in our case) when respondents do not give the same rating to two hypothetical parties with the same attributes because the attributes seen in previous trials influence their choices on the current trial. One way to examine the plausibility of this assumption is to test whether the estimated weights on attribute statements change significantly when one compares estimates obtained from each trial separately. A simple way to accomplish this test is to estimate a regression that includes not only the attributes of interest, but also indicators for each trial and the interactions between these indicators and the attributes. A joint F-test of the significance of the interactions is a test of the stability of the

attribute weights (and so the possibility of cross-over effects). We estimated this joint F-test for each attribute reported in this paper and failed to reject the null hypothesis that the trial interactions were jointly zero in every case.[4]

Other assumptions (like profile order effects) discussed in that article are not relevant to our design (i.e., we do not offer more than one profile in a trial). In addition, our choice to limit the number of attributes to four per trial and to randomize the order of these attributes by respondent makes it highly unlikely that the order of attributes shown to respondents makes any difference to our estimates. Nevertheless, we conducted the order test suggested by Hainmueller et al. (2014: 26) and confirmed this expectation. Finally, randomization of profiles is guaranteed by design in our case and all our balance tests confirmed that.

C3. Profile Distributions

We follow Cuesta et al.'s (2020) suggestion of designating one set of attributes as the focal ones and considering the other attributes as "controls." For example, we maintain the uniform distribution for the "cooperation" variables and adjust the marginal distributions of the control variables when there is a plausible reason to do so – i.e., when deviations from uniform for these variables are indicated by plausibly relevant data on the real-world distribution of these characteristics (among new parties, existing parties, or some other reasonable target population of parties). If we have any reason (either logically or empirically) to alter the uniform distribution assumption, we adjust the target profile distribution to re-produce our estimates accordingly and examine if these changes make any difference to our inferences about the impact of the attribute on left-right placements.[5]

For each of the attribution categories, we have asked ourselves whether we are satisfied with inferences about the impact on left-right placements of new parties that are only valid in a world in which new parties are equally likely to have the subsequent attribute levels. Below is our discussion and justification of using or adjusting the uniform distribution for each of the attributes and the levels.

a. Be led by a woman or man?

Our respondents were equally likely to see a new party that was headed by a woman or a man and, perhaps surprisingly to some, this comports well with the empirical record. Specifically, the percentage of female leaders among the existing parties that were included in our survey (at the time of our fieldwork) was 40% Canada, 40% for Denmark, 67% for Germany, and 50% for the UK. These facts, as well as the clear trend toward more equal representation of women in the top leadership of parties suggests we should be satisfied with inferences that assume an equal for distribution of this variable.

b. Support or oppose a given policy or value?

We chose the policy (and value) statements included in the surveys precisely because they were active areas of political conflict among existing parties. It is very easy to imagine real parties that could emerge on either side of each issue. Further, since we conducted a complete observational

[4] This is a very large number of results that cannot be included given the length constraints for the appendix. Results are available from the authors.

[5] Importantly, we examine the impact of each the adjustments to the profile distribution that are discussed below simultaneously, not separately.

analysis that paralleled our conjoint experiment, we know the distribution of perceived policy positions of all the existing parties in each country on each of our policy and values statements. This evidence largely confirms that the respondents in our surveys thought that the support and oppose position on each policy was about equally represented among the existing parties at the time of the survey. In no case did less than 30% of respondent-party placements fall on one side of the middle position on the scale and most often this proportion was close to 50% (since these statements only had two levels – support and oppose – this is the relevant comparison).[6]

That said, there was one value statement we include in the study whose distribution, for both logical and empirical reasons, may need adjustment. This was a statement with two levels: the party "Believes that men and women should be treated equally in economic and public life" or "Believes that there are legitimate reasons to treat men and women differently in economic and public life." Most of our respondents thought that the active parties in their systems believed the former rather than the latter. The pattern is the same across all of our countries, with about 70% of the parties being perceived as holding the pro gender inclusivity position.

Perhaps more importantly (given that the population of existing parties is not really the ideal target population to examine here), it makes logical sense that in modern Western democracies most parties cannot reasonably maintain a position in favor of gender inclusivity. That is why we tried to phrase the unequal position as "softly" as we could – i.e., that there are "legitimate reasons" for inclusivity rather than saying genders should be treated unequally. Nevertheless, most of our respondents did not think the unequal position was common among current parties and most reasonable projections to future new parties would likely agree that those espousing gender inclusivity are less likely. Thus, in the adjusted target distribution we construct, we use a 70/30 split for those two levels (adjusting the probability of all other levels accordingly).

c. Often or seldom cooperate with each of the existing parties?

While our main concern is exploring how adjustment to the profile distribution used to estimate the impact of partisan cooperation matters to our inferences about those variables, it is worth thinking for a moment about whether the uniform distribution for these variables is satisfying (i.e., an equal chance that a new party would often or seldom cooperate with a given existing party). After all, our

[6] It is also a mistake to pretend that this data is definitive on the question and so should only complement the logical argument that we would expect new parties to emerge on both sides of these issues. Specifically, these data are only about existing parties that were successful enough to be included in the study and so did not include several small parties in each system. Further, the designation of the midpoint of a seven-point policy scale as the cut-off between the dichotomous categories of support and oppose the policy is not obviously correct. The end point on each of our scales were labelled with the corresponding statement that appeared in the conjoint (e.g.., opposes/supports a specific policy) but the middle point was not labeled as the neutral position. If our respondents thought, for example that the dividing line between parties that support vs oppose a policy in their country a was bit more right or left, this would alter the relevant distribution we should examine. All of this is simply to say, there is no point in pretending to precision in our understanding of the relevant empirical distributions. Instead, if we have no logical reason to worry that one side of a policy would be shunned by new parties and no very clear evidence of lopsided representation of a policy position among existing parties, then we should be satisfied with the uniform assumption.

inferences about the impact of the other variables depend on this distribution.[7] For the major existing parties on the left and right, as well as any other existing parties that regularly cooperate with at least some other parties, it's hard to imagine a world in which new parties are systematically more likely to cooperate (or not) with these parties. Certainly, some would likely cooperate only with rightist parties and others only with leftists, but over the whole set of imagined new parties, we have no reason to think an existing party that is willing to cooperate at all with other parties would not find some new parties to work with while rejecting working with others.

There are two caveats to this argument. First, there are certainly some existing parties that do not cooperate very much with any party. Anti-system parties, or pariah parties, can be shunned by most other parties and so it is likely a random new party would be much less likely to "often cooperate" with such a party than to "seldom cooperate" with it. Usefully, our surveys included a question which asked respondents to rate, on a scale of 0-10, the extent to which each pair of existing parties in the country tended to cooperate. In most cases, respondents thought that a given party cooperated with some parties but not with others (e.g., the median cooperation score for CDU-SPD was 7 but only 3 for CDU-Linke). However, across all four countries there was one party that cooperated with no other party (in the view of our respondents). This party was the German AfD, which had median cooperation scores of 1, 0, 1, 0, 0 with the five other German parties. Thus, in analyzing the impact of variables other than cooperation variables in Germany, it would be prudent to adjust the uniform distribution over seldom and often cooperating with the AfD to, perhaps, a 90/10 split. Of course, if it's possible a party cooperates with no one, it is also possible some parties cooperate with everyone. We have no existing parties, however, for which this is the case. While our respondents often assigned middle cooperation scores to most dyads involving a party, this is indicative of the opinion that the party is about equally likely to cooperate with the party as not and not that it always can be expected to cooperate with any party. Indeed, we have no cases in which the median cooperation scores for each dyad involving a party are above 6 on our 10-point scale.

d. Strongly or weakly supported by a given social group included in our study?

We can easily imagine the kinds of new parties that would be strongly or weakly supported by different social groups. For example, we have no reason to suppose that the supply of new parties that would appeal to (the "social group" of) educated voters is any more or less than the supply that would appeal to less educated voters. The same logic applies to all of the large (and common) social groups included in our analysis. That is, if imposing a uniform distribution over weak and strong support for a new party from one of these social groups means our inferences are only applicable to a world in which this assumption holds, we are happy to impose this condition. Further, since we only included large and common social groups in the study, this assumption is even more plausible. For example, we would likely *not* be satisfied with this assumption had we included fringe social groups (e.g., Satanists) in the study. For these social groups, we could not reasonably expect any (or at least not half) of plausible new parties to appeal to these groups and so would not expect them to support and oppose new parties with about equal probability.

e. Have 10%, 30%, 50%, or 70% of female candidates?

[7] Keep in mind that the cooperation variables are all in the same "slot" in our analysis, so inferences about the effect of one of these variables (i.e., cooperation with the Conservatives) does not depend on the profile distribution of other cooperation variables (i.e., cooperation with Labour).

Data on the percentage of female candidates from the existing parties in our sample are not generally available, but O'Brien (2020) has collected the number of female MPs by party in recent elections. This data confirms a great deal of variability across different parties that broadly covers the categories (10%-70%) we included in our design. For example, after the most recent German election, the AfD had only 12% female MPs while the Greens had 61%. The other parties were more or less uniformly distributed between (23% for the FDP, 20% for the CDU/CSU -- which was lower than their average of around 30% in previous elections, 42% for SPD, and 54% for the Left party). Our other countries are similar, though these top out at lower percentages than in Germany (with few parties having more than 50% female MPs). However, based on research that has examined the association between numbers of female candidates and numbers of female MPs, we can safely assume this average percentage is larger for candidates than MPs, which would mitigate the lower frequency for the higher categories.

Still, to be safe, we include an adjustment to the uniform profile distribution on this dimension in our re-analysis under alternative target distributions that brings it more into line with the frequencies above. Specifically, our target profile distribution assumes the category "10% female candidates" occurs in 10% of parties, "30% of female candidates" occurs in 35% of parties, "50% of female candidates" occurs in 50% of parties, and "70% of female candidates" occurs in only 5% of parties.

f. Have 30% or 50% party gender quotas?

Finally, respondents sometimes saw a statement that indicated that the new party had a 30% or 50% gender quota, with each level occurring with equal probability. The uniform assumption for these two quota levels is broadly consistent with the empirical record. For example, German parties with formal quotas for candidates set these at 40-50%, while those with informal quotas or targets (the CDU /CSU) set these at 30%.

g. Have no seats in the legislature, be the 5th largest, 4th largest, or 3rd largest?

In our choice of new party sizes, we only included the possibility that a new party would be relatively small and so we have already included in the design a distribution of party sizes tailored to the reality of how big parties tend to be when they first enter electoral politics. Still, we did assume a uniform distribution of party sizes among the categories we included. To examine the plausibility of this assumption, we looked back at all the new parties that entered politics in our countries since 2000 (and that eventually gained seats in the legislature) and determined where they fit into the categories above. We found that among the 5 new parties to gain legislative seats during this period in our countries, 2 became the 3rd largest, one became the 5th largest, one the 6th largest, and one the 7th largest. Thus, our choice of an equal chance that a new party gaining seats in the legislature might enter somewhere lower than third (with roughly equal chance) seems reasonable.

A different conclusion, however, applies to the category of "no seats." First, several of the parties included above actually entered politics in an election in which they gained no seats and only gained seats in the subsequent election. Further, there are many examples of parties that ran in election and gained no legislative seats. Thus, it does seem to be a departure from reality to assign the same probability to the attribute level "no seats" as the others. Thus, in the target distribution we use below, we adjust this probability downwards so that any given party has an 80% chance of not obtaining a seat but, conditional on obtaining a seat, the exact size is uniform.

h. Draw support for a single vs. multiple regions of the country?

In our study, respondents had an equal chance of being told a party was a regionally based party vs. a national party. Given the fact that it is easier for a new party to organize and compete regionally than across the whole country, this seems a plausible assumption. Indeed, our worry should not be that the uniform distribution gives too high a probability to regional parties but that it is too low. Here, however, we can look to the actual experience of new parties support (using the same parties discussed above) and we find that in fact it's common for new parties to draw support from more than one region (which is the exact wording used in our survey) rather than only one. Thus, we are satisfied with the uniform distribution in this case.

To include all the different adjustments to the profile distribution mentioned above, we used the methods described in Cuesta et al. (2020). These adjustments made no difference to our conclusions and indeed had little impact on the numerical values of our estimates.

C4. Causal Interactions

We examine whether there is evidence of strong causal interactions between our different attributes in each of our four countries by estimating unregularized linear regressions that include all the possible two-way interactions (using the Findit program in R – de la Cuesta et al. 2020). For example, we estimate how the effect of supporting vs. opposing limiting immigration differs when we also tell respondents that the new party either has strong support among men or has weak support from men.[8]

We use unregularized linear regressions since our attributes are almost all binary (including all the focal ones). As Cuesta et al. (2020) make clear, "while regularization is generally preferred, the factors here are binary. Since the goal of regularization is to improve efficiency by collapsing levels of a factor that have similar effects, regularization is not needed in this case."

Given the design pictured in Figure 3, there are a large number of possible interactions across all the levels of all our attributes (11,024 summed across all four country studies). However, only 112 (or 1.02%) of these interactions were statistically different from zero at conventional levels. This confirms that there is not much evidence for strong causal interactions between our different attributes in influencing voters' beliefs about the left-right positions of new parties.

[8] As with the AMCE, the AMIE is invariant to the choice of baseline and so we can rescale to remove the arbitrary baseline and estimate the effect of the "support" vs. "oppose" version of the attribute.

Appendix D: Baseline Results

Figure D1 gives the estimates of the AMCE of each of our attributes on left-right placements. To ease interpretation, we reported results for the specific version (oppose or support) of each statement within the policy and values slot, social group slot, and cooperation slot that we judged (a priori) to be most likely to move placements to the right. In this way, one can easily compare the overall size of the effects to each other (and to 0). Further, any negative estimates within these attributes are readily identified as unexpected (given our intuitions). Since the estimate of each statement is the reciprocal of its pair, this choice is purely cosmetic. For the size, scope, and gender composition/quota attributes (Slot 6), the AMCEs are estimated relative to an arbitrary baseline (i.e., 10% women candidates). Likewise, Figure D2 provides the marginal mean (MM) of all levels of conjoint attributes and makes it clear that the relationship between the AMCE's in D1 and the MM's in D2 display none of the pathological issues that Leeper et al.'s (2020) work has highlighted.

Figure D1. AMCEs of all attributes






Figure D2. Marginal Means (All Attributes)



Appendix E. Results by Political Sophistication

We code each respondent into one of three levels of political sophistication using their answers to three survey questions on current political events, self-reported political interest, and self-reported familiarity with the left-right concept. The high political sophistication group are those who are familiar with the left-right, whose political knowledge score (based on three questions) is above the country's median, and who are very or fairly interested in politics. The low political sophistication group includes those who are either unfamiliar with the left-right concept and below the country's median on political knowledge, or who are politically disinterested and below the median on political knowledge. The rest of the respondents are categorized as having a medium level political sophistication. This produces three roughly equal sized groups. Figure E1 below shows the AMCEs of all the attributes used in our experiment for respondents of different levels of political sophistication in each country.

Figure E1. AMCEs by levels of political sophistication



Note: solid circles indicate high level of political sophistication; hollowed circles indicate low level of sophitication. Medium level sohphistication is not reported here; but in general the effects for medium group are in between the high and low sohpistication group

Appendix F: AMCEs of Various Attributes on Left-Right Positions of Hypothetical Parties in Canada, Denmark, Germany, and the UK

DV = perceived LR position of hypothetical parties	Canada	Denmark	Germany	UK
Policies (Base=Support Limited Immigration)				
Oppose limited immigration	-0.820** (0.143)	1.847** (0.132)	-1.041** (0.132)	-0.712** (0.135)
Support cutting taxes less spending	-0.185 (0.135)	1.513** (0.134)	-0.732** (0.116)	-0.506** (0.133)
Oppose cutting taxes less spending	-0.758** (0.138)	0.300* (0.126)	-0.870** (0.114)	-0.665** (0.129)
Support cutting taxes more debt	-0.636** (0.141)	1.020** (0.134)	-0.873** (0.117)	-0.854** (0.133)
Oppose cutting taxes more debt	-0.508** (0.132)	0.665** (0.123)	-0.793** (0.111)	-0.616** (0.130)
Support government regulations	-0.812** (0.144)	0.225 (0.127)	-0.927** (0.113)	-0.757** (0.134)
Oppose government regulations	-0.407** (0.141)	1.227** (0.130)	-0.622** (0.115)	-0.502** (0.127)
Support military spending	-0.127 (0.138)	1.248** (0.132)	-0.390** (0.117)	-0.215 (0.122)
Oppose military spending	-0.892** (0.140)	0.264* (0.128)	-1.199** (0.120)	-1.190** (0.135)
Support increase tax on fossil fuels	-1.375** (0.141)	0.119 (0.128)	-1.203** (0.119)	-1.073** (0.138)
Oppose increase tax on fossil fuels	-0.279* (0.132)	1.039** (0.131)	-0.695** (0.116)	-0.517** (0.128)
Support increase spending on healthcare	-1.162** (0.143)	0.599** (0.124)	-1.132** (0.121)	-1.141** (0.131)
Oppose increase spending on healthcare	-0.0843 (0.137)	1.032** (0.134)	-0.542** (0.120)	-0.223 (0.137)
Support limiting govt surveillance	-0.697** (0.139)	0.976** (0.127)	-0.496** (0.114)	-1.027** (0.137)
Oppose limiting govt surveillance	-0.460** (0.135)	0.777** (0.131)	-0.986** (0.120)	-0.399** (0.125)
Support hard Brexit				0.110 (0.140)
Oppose hard Brexit				-1.039** (0.132)
Support marijuana legalization	-1.250** (0.148)	0.954** (0.125)	-1.345** (0.117)	

Oppose marijuana legalization	0.157 (0.141)	0.159 (0.127)	-0.576** (0.122)	
Support cooperation with the EU		0.748** (0.132)	-1.019** (0.119)	
Oppose cooperation with the EU		0.857** (0.122)	-0.185 (0.118)	
Support income redistribution	-1.286** (0.150)	1.405** (0.138)	-1.340** (0.127)	-1.571** (0.135)
Oppose income redistribution	0.109 (0.143)	-0.0713 (0.126)	-0.489** (0.122)	-0.222 (0.138)
Support cultural diversity	-1.242** (0.154)	1.505** (0.139)	-1.760** (0.122)	-1.306** (0.139)
Oppose cultural diversity	0.280* (0.142)	0.0648 (0.125)	0.526** (0.119)	0.102 (0.127)
Civil liberty more impt than security	-0.994** (0.142)	0.763** (0.125)	-1.163** (0.122)	-1.230** (0.137)
Security more impt than civil liberty	-0.122 (0.139)	1.359** (0.131)	0.0931 (0.115)	0.0889 (0.127)
Gov't should play bigger role	-0.890** (0.143)	0.266* (0.124)	-1.125** (0.115)	-0.880** (0.128)
Gov't should play smaller role	-0.513** (0.132)	1.215** (0.129)	-0.611** (0.115)	-0.527** (0.124)
Support gender inclusivity	-0.876** (0.141)	0.582** (0.126)	-1.181** (0.122)	-0.895** (0.131)
Allow unequal treatment between genders	-0.115 (0.143)	1.288** (0.131)	-0.188 (0.120)	-0.206 (0.131)
Social Group (Base=Strong Support among Men)				
Weak support among men	-0.455** (0.125)	-0.278* (0.108)	-0.292** (0.0964)	-0.218* (0.107)
Strong support among women	-0.544** (0.128)	-0.239* (0.106)	-0.505** (0.0948)	-0.165 (0.111)
Weak support among women	0.0381 (0.131)	-0.0734 (0.109)	-0.0611 (0.0912)	-0.0426 (0.107)
Strong support among religious voters	0.401** (0.135)	0.0573 (0.111)	0.0850 (0.0915)	0.152 (0.113)
Weak support among religious voters	-0.503** (0.131)	-0.179 (0.111)	-0.0724 (0.0951)	-0.0876 (0.112)
Strong support among union households	-0.758** (0.131)	-0.658** (0.115)	-0.659** (0.0950)	-0.705** (0.120)
Weak support among union households	-0.112 (0.125)	0.0703 (0.109)	-0.0978 (0.0949)	0.0660 (0.113)
Strong support among university graduates	-0.457** (0.125)	-0.202 (0.109)	-0.226* (0.0922)	-0.171 (0.112)
Weak support among university graduates	-0.238 (0.127)	-0.129 (0.106)	-0.137 (0.0907)	0.0481 (0.110)
Strong support among young voters	-0.622**	-0.437**	-0.374**	-0.150

	(0.132)	(0.111)	(0.0907)	(0.113)
Weak support among young voters	-0.260*	-0.0776	-0.142	0.107
	(0.129)	(0.109)	(0.0890)	(0.108)
Strong support among older voters	-0.00311	-0.00606	-0.0597	0.238*
	(0.133)	(0.108)	(0.0941)	(0.115)
Weak support among older voters	-0.432**	-0.197	-0.345**	-0.264*
	(0.129)	(0.108)	(0.0971)	(0.107)
Strong support among urban voters	-0.268*	-0.361**	-0.165	-0.123
	(0.130)	(0.111)	(0.0894)	(0.112)
Weak support among urban voters	-0.194	0.0498	-0.194*	-0.105
	(0.128)	(0.107)	(0.0922)	(0.111)
Strong support among rural voters	-0.255*	-0.172	-0.103	0.133
	(0.129)	(0.111)	(0.0869)	(0.114)
Weak support among rural voters	-0.417**	-0.255*	-0.217*	-0.0421
	(0.129)	(0.107)	(0.0921)	(0.112)
Strong support among suburban voters	-0.198	0.108		-0.0638
	(0.120)	(0.109)		(0.109)
Weak support among suburban voters	-0.265*	-0.291**		0.0338
	(0.126)	(0.106)		(0.115)
Strong support among working class	-0.310*	-0.625**	-0.519**	-0.483**
	(0.127)	(0.111)	(0.0946)	(0.113)
Weak support among working voters	-0.382**	0.134	-0.153	0.256*
	(0.135)	(0.108)	(0.0973)	(0.116)
Strong support among upper class	0.190	-0.427**	-0.281**	0.737**
	(0.132)	(0.114)	(0.0943)	(0.117)
Weak support among upper class	-0.494**	0.612**	0.0621	-0.376**
	(0.124)	(0.111)	(0.0927)	(0.112)
Strong support among middle class	-0.267*	-0.0670	-0.298**	0.217
	(0.125)	(0.106)	(0.0960)	(0.112)
Weak support among middle class	-0.303*	-0.111	-0.0799	-0.239*
	(0.126)	(0.106)	(0.0890)	(0.105)
Strong support among Quebec voters	-0.416**			
	(0.129)			
Weak support among Quebec voters	-0.283*			
	(0.125)			
Gender, Size, and Scope (Base=10% Female Candidates)				
30% female candidates	-0.247**	-0.126	-0.0951	-0.0445
	(0.0838)	(0.0765)	(0.0693)	(0.0771)
50% female candidates	-0.531**	-0.240**	-0.0196	-0.161*
	(0.0881)	(0.0736)	(0.0695)	(0.0820)
70% female candidates	-0.606**	-0.270**	-0.221**	-0.253**
	(0.0956)	(0.0783)	(0.0698)	(0.0805)
30% female candidates' quota	-0.285**	-0.252**	-0.125	-0.176*
	(0.0871)	(0.0729)	(0.0694)	(0.0811)
50% female candidates' quota	-0.476**	-0.407**	-0.269**	-0.158*
	(0.0899)	(0.0766)	(0.0715)	(0.0768)

3rd largest party	-0.183*	-0.0650	-0.0338	-0.0333
	(0.0909)	(0.0746)	(0.0678)	(0.0788)
4th largest party	-0.144	-0.0712	-0.0443	-0.0647
	(0.0874)	(0.0751)	(0.0694)	(0.0795)
5th largest party	-0.263**	-0.0172	0.00236	-0.00590
	(0.0891)	(0.0746)	(0.0700)	(0.0791)
No seats	-0.305**	-0.118	0.0169	-0.0487
	(0.0889)	(0.0774)	(0.0704)	(0.0775)
Support from many regions	-0.225*	-0.191*	-0.0147	-0.0469
	(0.0879)	(0.0755)	(0.0717)	(0.0810)
Support from one region	-0.114	-0.00556	0.0481	-0.0182
	(0.0885)	(0.0755)	(0.0701)	(0.0785)
Gender of party leaders (Base=Male)				
Female	-0.0914**	-0.174**	-0.130**	-0.0989**
	(0.0339)	(0.0291)	(0.0265)	(0.0318)
Constant	6.943**	4.007**	6.269**	6.981**
	(0.170)	(0.163)	(0.138)	(0.152)
Observations	17,810	24,560	19,550	18,180
R-squared	0.098	0.143	0.203	0.136

Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Cooperation Canada ***Cooperation Denmark***

Cooperation (Base=Support Conservative-led Govt)		**Cooperation (Base=Support Sd-led Govt)**	
Does not support Conservative-led Govt	-1.314** (0.110)	Does not support Sd-led Govt	1.148** (0.121)
Support Liberal-led Govt	-1.293** (0.111)	Support Venstre-led Govt	1.612** (0.124)
Does not support Liberal-led Govt	-0.304** (0.0957)	Does not support Venstre-led Govt	0.627** (0.108)
Often cooperates with the Conservative	0.0421 (0.0908)	Often cooperates with the Sd	0.0621 (0.103)
Seldom cooperates with the Conservative	-1.176** (0.105)	Seldom cooperates with the Sd	1.133** (0.122)
Often cooperates with the Liberals	-1.261** (0.107)	Often cooperates with Venstre	1.659** (0.122)
Seldom cooperates with the Liberals	-0.364** (0.0984)	Seldom cooperates with Venstre	0.348** (0.115)
Often cooperates with the NDP	-1.415** (0.105)	Often cooperates with RadVen	0.297* (0.115)
Seldom cooperates with the NDP	-0.431** (0.101)	Seldom cooperates with RadVen	0.943** (0.112)
Often cooperates with the Greens	-1.355** (0.107)	Often cooperates with DF	1.909** (0.126)
Seldom cooperates with the	-0.673**	Seldom cooperates with DF	0.421**

Greens	(0.0987)		(0.110)
Often cooperates with BQ	-0.949** (0.103)	Often cooperates with Enh	-0.788** (0.114)
Seldom cooperates with BQ	-0.696** (0.0942)	Seldom cooperates with Enh	1.457** (0.116)
		Often cooperates with Liberal Alliance	1.593** (0.119)
		Seldom cooperates with Liberal Alliance	0.761** (0.113)
		Often cooperates with SF	-0.341** (0.113)

Cooperation Germany ***Cooperation UK***


Cooperation (Base=Support CDU-led Govt)		**Cooperation (Base=Support Cons-led Govt)**	
Does not support CDU-led Govt	-0.312** (0.0823)	Does not support Cons-led Govt	-1.698** (0.102)
Support SPD-led Govt	-0.851** (0.0813)	Support Lab-led Govt	-2.122** (0.105)
Does not support SPD-led Govt	0.0712 (0.0820)	Does not support Lab-led Govt	-0.581** (0.0910)
Often cooperates with the CDU	0.156* (0.0716)	Often cooperates with the Conservatives	-0.0834 (0.0819)
Seldom cooperates with the CDU	-0.339** (0.0803)	Seldom cooperates with the Conservatives	-1.631** (0.102)
Often cooperates with SPD	-0.908** (0.0797)	Often cooperates with Labour	-2.107** (0.108)
Seldom cooperates with SPD	-0.229** (0.0775)	Seldom cooperates with Labour	-0.562** (0.0946)
Often cooperates with FDP	-0.0893 (0.0778)	Often cooperates with the LibDems	-1.402** (0.0935)
Seldom cooperates with FDP	-0.235** (0.0807)	Seldom cooperates with the LibDems	-1.006** (0.0908)
Often cooperates with AfD	2.038** (0.0937)	Often cooperates with SNP	-1.372** (0.101)
Seldom cooperates with AfD	-0.139 (0.0897)	Seldom cooperates with SNP	-1.020** (0.0927)
Often cooperates with Linke	-1.917** (0.0951)	Often cooperates with UKIP	-0.149 (0.104)
Seldom cooperates with Linke	-0.0416 (0.0825)	Seldom cooperates with UKIP	-1.250** (0.0993)
Often cooperates with the Greens	-1.192** (0.0870)	Often cooperates with the Greens	-1.551** (0.101)
Seldom cooperates with the Greens	-0.116 (0.0836)	Seldom cooperates with the Greens	-0.923** (0.0936)

Appendix G: U.S. Citizens' Perceptions of the Gender Composition of Parties' Electoral Coalitions

To provide additional evidence that citizens possess perceptions about the gender composition of parties' electoral coalitions, we draw on data from a nationally representative survey of U.S. respondents fielded by YouGov in April 15–20, 2026 (N = 2,207 U.S. adult citizens). Respondents were asked, *"Which would you say is more the party of...?"* for a range of social groups.

The results in Figure G1 indicate that Americans hold clear perceptions about the relationship between gender and party support. That is, respondents overwhelmingly associate women with the Democratic Party and men with the Republican Party. Indeed, among the social groups included in the survey, gender produces some of the strongest partisan associations, particularly with respect to perceptions of men as supporters of the Republican Party. These findings suggest that citizens possess meaningful perceptions about the gender composition of parties' electoral coalitions.


Figure G1. Perceived partisan leanings of social groups



Notes. Estimates are based on a nationally representative YouGov survey of 2,207 U.S. adult citizens fielded April 15–20, 2026. Respondents were asked, *"Which would you say is more the party of...?"* Values report the difference between the percentage selecting the Democratic Party and the percentage selecting the Republican Party for each social group, excluding respondents who answered "Not sure." Positive values indicate perceived Democratic affiliation; negative values indicate perceived Republican affiliation.

One concern is that these patterns could simply reflect excluding respondents who answered, "Not sure." To assess this possibility, we also examine the proportion of respondents who were uncertain about the partisan affiliation of each social group (Figure G2). Uncertainty is relatively low for gender: only about 20% of respondents reported that they were unsure whether women were more closely associated with the Democratic or Republican Party, and even fewer expressed uncertainty about men. Together, these results suggest that perceptions linking women to the Democratic Party and men to the Republican Party are both widespread and confidently held.

Figure G2. Perceived partisan leanings of social groups and uncertainty about those leanings




Notes. Estimates are based on a nationally representative YouGov survey of 2,207 U.S. adult citizens fielded April 15–20, 2026. Respondents were asked, *"Which would you say is more the party of...?"* The horizontal axis reports the percentage of respondents answering "Not sure" for each social group. The vertical axis reports the perceived partisan lean of each group (Democratic % minus Republican %), excluding respondents who answered, "Not sure." Women and men are associated with relatively low levels of uncertainty, suggesting that citizens possess strong perceptions about the gender composition of parties' electoral coalitions.

Furthermore, we have additional evidence from our own surveys that these perceptions correspond to observable differences in the gender composition of parties' electorates. In each of the four countries, respondents were asked whether each real-world party received strong support from women. For every party, we calculated the percentage of respondents who answered affirmatively and compared this with the percentage of that party's voters who were women in the closest available CSES survey. We then correlated these two party-level measures separately within each country.

As shown in Figure G3 below, the relationship is strong in Denmark, Germany, and the UK. This shows that respondents' perceptions of which parties receive stronger support from women generally correspond to observable differences in the gender composition of parties' actual electorates. The correlation is weaker in Canada (r=0.17), largely because our survey respondents substantially underestimate the proportion of women among Bloc Québécois voters. When the Bloc Québécois is excluded however, the Canadian correlation increases to 0.77. Although these comparisons necessarily involve a small number of parties, they provide further evidence that respondents possess meaningful perceptions of parties' gendered electoral bases and that these perceptions generally correspond to the observed composition of party electorates. Taken together with the YouGov results, this evidence supports our argument that the gender composition of party support can be available to citizens as a heuristic cue, even though it is less directly visible than the gender of party leaders or elected representatives.

Figure G3. Perceived Women's Support and the Gender Composition of Party's Electorates




Notes. The x-axis represents the percentage of respondents in our survey who indicated that the party receives strong support from women. The vertical axis reports the percentage of that party's voters who were women in the closest available CSES survey. Correlations are calculated separately by country. For UKIP, the CSES value is proxied using the gender composition of Brexit Party voters because UKIP is not separately available in the relevant CSES survey. In Canada, the correlation increases from r=0.17 to r=0.77 when BQ is excluded.

Appendix H: Respondent Perceptions of the Gender Equality Policy Position Treatment

We acknowledge that the phrasing of our treatment instrument for gendered policy positions – "*there are legitimate reasons to treat men and women differently in economic and public life*" – might admit more than one interpretation. Some respondents may interpret differential treatment of men and women to reflect discriminatory measures, usually taken by parties on the right, to limit women's social, political, and economic equality. However, another possible interpretation is that differential treatment could refer to affirmative measures, such as gender quotas, that many on the political left support in order to achieve more equal outcomes. For these reasons, it is important to establish whether respondents interpreted the experimental treatment in the intended ideological direction. To this end, we conduct two validation exercises.

First, we examine respondents' placements of real parties on both the gender-equality scale and the left-right scale across the four countries in our surveys. If respondents interpret the *"different treatment"* pole as the more right-wing position, parties perceived as further to the right should also be placed closer to that pole on the gender-equality scale. This is exactly what we find. Across all four countries, the relationship is very strong, with correlations ranging from 0.84 in Canada to 0.96 in Germany (Figure H1).

Figure H1. Correlations between Left-Right Position and Gender Equality




Notes. The x-axis shows each party's average left–right placement, ranging from 0 (most left) to 10 (most right). The y-axis shows its average position on gender equality, ranging from 1 (support for

equal treatment) to 7 (support for differential treatment). Dashed lines are country-specific bivariate linear fits, and r reports the Pearson correlation coefficient.


The second validation analyzes respondents' self-placements on the gender-equality item. Across all four countries, respondents were concentrated near the equal-treatment pole. In every country, the modal response was 1, indicating support for equal treatment, and country averages ranged from 2.10 in Germany to 2.32 in the United Kingdom. More importantly, ideological self-placement predicted responses in the expected direction. As shown in Figures H2 and H3, respondents who identified with the political left placed themselves systematically closer to the equal-treatment pole than respondents who identified with the political right. Although equal treatment remains the modal response among both ideological groups, right-leaning respondents' responses are consistently more dispersed and closer to the *"different treatment"* pole.

Figure H2. Leftist Respondents' Positions on Gender Equality



Notes. The figure shows the distribution of respondents' positions on gender equality among leftist respondents, defined as those placing themselves between 0 and 3 on the 0–10 left–right scale. Bars report the percentage of respondents selecting each response category, ranging from 1 (equal treatment) to 7 (differential treatment). Dashed vertical lines indicate the country-specific mean, with the corresponding mean value reported beside each line.

Figure H3. Rightist Respondents' Positions on Gender Equality



Notes. The figure shows the distribution of respondents' positions on gender equality among rightist respondents, defined as those placing themselves between 7 and 10 on the 0–10 left–right scale. Bars report the percentage of respondents selecting each response category, ranging from 1 (equal treatment) to 7 (differential treatment). Dashed vertical lines indicate the country-specific mean, with the corresponding mean value reported beside each line.

Taken together, these validation exercises suggest that respondents generally interpreted the item in the intended ideological direction. Although the wording could plausibly admit multiple interpretations in the abstract, respondents' evaluations of both real parties and their own ideological positions align closely with our intended conceptualization.