Supplemental Materials for "Party Responsiveness to the Collective Judgment of the Electorate: The Case of Presidential Popularity in Latin America"

(*Comparative Political Studies*)

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Appendix A. List of elections and parties in the sample

Country	Election	Party (C=Coalition)	Elections Concurrent
Argentina	Apr. 2003	Alianza/UCR, ARI, **PJ**	Y
Argentina	Oct. 2005	Alianza/UCR, ARI, **PJ**, **FV**	N
Argentina	Jun. 2009	**Pro-Kirchner** (C), Center-Right (C), Left (C)	N
Bolivia	Dec. 2005	**MNR**, NFR, MIR, MAS, PODEMOS	Y
Bolivia	Dec. 2009	**MAS**, PODEMOS	Y
Brazil	Oct. 2006	**PT**, PFL, PMDB, PSDB	Y
Brazil	Oct. 2010	**PT**, DEM, PMDB, PSDB	Y
Chile	Dec. 2005	**CPD**, APC	Y
Chile	Dec. 2009	**CPD**, APC	Y
Colombia	Mar. 2006	PCC, PLC, CR, PSUN	N
Colombia	Mar. 2010	PCC, PLC, CR, PSUN	N
Costa Rica	Feb. 2006	**USC**, AC, LN, ML	Y
Costa Rica	Feb. 2010	USC, AC, **LN**, ML	Y
Dominican Rep.	May. 2006	**PLD**, PRD, PRSC	N
Dominican Rep.	May. 2010	**PLD**, PRD, PRSC	N
Ecuador	Oct. 2006	ID-RED, PRIAN, **PSP**, PSC, MUPP-NP	Y
Ecuador	Apr. 2009	ID, PRIAN, PSP, PSC, **PAIS**	Y
El Salvador	Mar. 2003	**ARENA**, FMLN, PCN	N
El Salvador	Mar. 2006	**ARENA**, FMLN, PCN	N
El Salvador	Jan. 2009	**ARENA**, FMLN, PCN	N
Guatemala	Nov. 2003	**FRG**, PAN	Y
Honduras	Nov. 2005	PL, **PN**	Y
Honduras	Nov. 2009	**PL**, PN	Y
Mexico	Jul. 2003	**PAN**, PRI, PRD	N
Mexico	Jul. 2006	**PAN**, PRI, PRD	Y
Mexico	Jul. 2009	**PAN**, PRI, PRD	N
Nicaragua	Nov. 2006	**PLC**, PSLN	Y
Panama	May. 2004	PRD, **PA**, PS, CD	Y
Panama	May. 2009	**PRD**, PP, PS, CD	Y
Paraguay	Apr. 2003	**ANR-PC**, PLRA, PPQ, UNACE	Y
Paraguay	Apr. 2008	**ANR-PC**, PLRA, PPQ, UNACE	Y
Peru	Apr. 2006	PAP, UN (C), **PP**, UP	Y
Uruguay	Oct. 2004	FA-EP-NM (C), **PC**, PNB	Y
Uruguay	Oct. 2009	**FA**, PC, PNB	Y
Venezuela	Dec. 2005	**MVR**, AD, MAS, COPEI, PV, PPT	N

[*] Presidential parties are in bold.

Appendix B. Coding scheme

The key explanatory variable, *Responsiveness*, is an index created from two components: *Cooperation* and *Differential Popularity*. The component *Cooperation* is an observed party stance toward the president on salient issues, and the component *Differential Popularity* measures the weights and the direction of the effects of the observed party stance on the legislative electoral outcomes.

Here I identify the coding rules for Cooperation used to decide whether a party was cooperative with the president. This coding of a partys relationship with the president proceeded in two steps of decisions as follows:

1. Type of Party: I categorize parties as either presidential or non-presidential parties. A presidential party refers to the party with which the president had been affiliated at the time he or she was elected. A non-presidential party refers to a party that is not the presidential party, including opposition parties and the president's allies if the coalition did not last for the whole period between elections.

2. Party Stance on President: Presidential parties are coded as non-cooperative (Cooperation=?1) when they criticize or take an opposite position to the president and government, at least on one issue that is reported in the source (Latin American Newsletter Regional & Weekly Reports). Conversely, non-presidential parties are coded as cooperative (Cooperation=1) when they stand with the president on at least one issue on which parties in the country have different positions (an issue of conflict). Otherwise, by default, presidential parties are coded as cooperative and non-presidential parties as non-cooperative.

There are two additional rules associated with each step. These are listed below with actual examples.

1. Type of Parties

A. Allies

Allies to the president and her party are deemed non-presidential parties unless the same alliance had remained over the two consecutive elections. The main reason for this rule is that allied parties are not fully responsible for the outcome of the government's and/or the president's performance. Moreover, like other opposition parties, they are free to defect from the President. For this reason, I code allies following the rule applied to non-presidential parties. That is, if they oppose the president's stance over any salient issue that divides political parties, then that party is regarded as "non-cooperative."

- Example (Colombia 2006): President Uribe once belonged to the PLC but split from it to run for president as an independent. He was not affiliated with any party, but normally the PSUN and CR were known as his allies (Uribistas). "His supporters in congress have long been urging him to form his own party" but until then "he has been happy to rely on support from pro-government factions across the political spectrum, including from within the two largest parties: the Partido Liberal (PLC) and the Partido Conservador (PCC)." [Latin American Regional Reports, #Ra-05-05] In this case, I deemed all parties as non-presidential (i.e., there is no presidential party).

B. Party Split

If a group of party members defects, the partys type will be judged by the remaining members (including the party leader).

- Example (Colombia 2006): After the previous election, the PLC, which President Uribe once belonged to, was deeply divided between pro- and anti-government factions. In 2005, eventually the pro-Uribe members of PLC formed a new party (PSUN). In this case, the PLC is deemed a non-presidential party.

2. Party Stance on President

A. Party Leader's Stance

When a party leader's opinion is highlighted in the media, rather than an official party position by mentioning the party name only, I regard the leader's opinion as the party's stance on the issue in question.

- Example (Colombia 2010): Ahead of the 2010 election, constitutional reform was a salient issue. Although the CR was an ally of president Uribe, the leader of the CR, Germán Vargas Lleras, was explicitly opposed to Uribe's re-election. One might think that Vargas opposition to Uribe's re-election should not be seen as being antagonistic to president Uribe, in the sense that Uribe did not explicitly address his ambition to reelection until the decision of the Supreme Court was made. Instead, the constitutional reform is urged by Uribistas, who presumably can expect to hold power and win the election owing to Uribes high popularity. However, it makes sense to code the CRs position as "non-cooperative," given that the CR leader's opinion contrasted with the majority Colombian public opinion which supported Uribes reelection to a third-term – 66% in May 2008, 55% in March 2009, 57% in December 2009, and so forth.

B. Changing Relationships

If a party's (and/or its leader's) position has changed over time, I take the last minute stance before the election for coding its issue stance.

- Example (Paraguay 2003): The ANR-PC (ruling Colorado party) is coded as non-cooperative. On the issue of the impeachment of President Macci, the Colorado party was generally prone to support the President. The party shielded Macci in the impeachment voting on 9/6/2001. This stance, however, changed later on: Arganistas leaders ordered their legislators to abstain from impeachment voting on 12/5/2002 (Perez-Liñan 2007), and the party leader supported the President's impeachment, changing his stance on this issue from the earlier trials. This change in relationship is noted in the media resources as well: "The lower chamber of congress has voted to impeach the President for corruption. Although he has been threatened with impeachment proceedings twice before, he is more vulnerable this time because many of his own Colorado party have turned against him." [Latin American Regional Reports, #Rs-02-12]

Appendix C. Supplementary statistical results

1. Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Changes in Vote Share	-1.33	11.89	-28.60	32.80	116
President's party	0.27	0.45	0	1	126
Approval Ratings	46.62	23.24	5	86	126
Differential Popularity	4.22	16.24	-49.30	71	106
Cooperation	-0.21	0.98	-1	1	126
Responsiveness (Continuous)	1.56	16.71	-43.60	71	106
Responsiveness (Dichotomous)	0.53	0.50	0	1	106
Strong Candidate	0.38	0.49	0	1	126

2. Mean Difference in Changes in Vote Share between Responsive and Non-Responsive Parties

[Top panel in Figure 2 is drawn based on the estimates below.]

	Changes in Vote Share		
	Mean	95% CI	Obs.
Responsive Party	0.89	(-1.68, 3.45)	53
Non-Responsive Party	-4.78	(-8.00, -1.56)	48
	Pr($|T| < |t|$)=0.006		100

3. Testing Bivariate Relationship using Dichotomous Index of Responsiveness

[Bottom panel of Figure 2 is marginal effects based on the estimates from Model 1 below.]

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Responsiveness (Dichotomous)	4.497**	4.497*	4.517*
	(2.09)	(2.32)	(2.35)
Presidential Party	-8.989**	-8.989**	-8.989**
	(3.61)	(3.27)	(3.23)
Responsiveness x Presidential Party	5.481	5.481	5.538
	(4.86)	(4.36)	(4.34)
Constant	-2.487	-2.487	-2.487
	(1.71)	(1.65)	(1.63)
N	100	100	100
Observations	0.205	0.214	0.224
R-squared	30.153	4.511	3.793
Log Likelihood	-367.868	-361.342	-361.308

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Model 1: OLS regression with robust standard errors. Model 2: Random intercept model with 2-level hierarchy (elections nested in country). Model 3: Random slope model with 2-level hierarchy (elections nested in country) with varying slope for the effect of responsiveness across elections. Estimates for the random part (in models 2 and 3) are not reported. [**] $p<0.05$, [*] $p<0.10$.

Appendix D. Robustness checks

Below are the replication results for descriptive statistics and statistical tests conducted with two changes in coding: 1) measuring "differential popularity" using a party's mean vote share from the **three past elections**, and 2) measuring "cooperation" (issue congruence) with a **higher threshold**, i.e., code as cooperative when a presidential party sides against the president or when an opposition party sides with the president on at least **two** issues.

1. Replication: Distribution of Cooperative and Responsive Parties

[Replication of Table 1]

	Cooperation			Responsiveness		
	Cooperative	Non-Cooperative	(Total)	Responsive	Non-Responsive	(Total)
Presidential	31	3	34	17	13	30
Non-Preidential	4	88	92	29	47	76
	35	91	126	46	60	106

2. Replication: Electoral Payoffs for Responsive and Non-Responsive Parties

[Replication of Figure 2]

Electoral Payoffs (Changes in % Votes)

3. Replication: Mean Difference in Changes in Vote Share between Responsive and Non-Responsive Parties

[Replication of Appendix C.2]

	Changes in Vote Share		
	Mean	95% CI	Obs.
Responsive Party	0.61	(-2.57, 3.79)	45
Non-Responsive Party	-3.84	(-6.52, -1.17)	56
	Pr($|T| < |t|$)=0.033		101

4. Replication: Marginal Effects of Responsiveness, Conditional on Party Type and Coattail Effects

[Replication of Figure 3]

Note: Marginal effects are calculated based on the estimates from the popularity-response model (OLS and random effects model). For a more detail about the statistical model, refer to the Table 2 in the text and the related explanations.